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NEW CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND PENAL THEORY 
IN SPANISH ABORTION LAW· 
Richard Stith·· 
The abortion debate in the United States is a clash of indi-
vidualisms: the proponents of individual rights for puta ti ve 
unborn persons array themselves against the advocates of indi-
vidual rights for women. Although the Left sides atmost exclu-
sively with the latter 1, it is hard to discern anything more than 
a tactical nexus of abortion-related issues with the socialist goal 
of community-based decisionmaking 2. 
* Artículo aparecido en «American Journal of Comparative Law», 35:3 
(Summer 1987). 
** Among those to whom 1 am much indebted for assistance are Profs. 
Antonio Carlos Pereira, Antonio García Cuadrado, Cole Durham, Mary Ann 
Glendon, John Gorby, Donald Kommers and John Potts. Many thanks also to 
Paige Cunningham, who collaborated with me on sorne translation matters. 
1 . Mark Tushnet, a former coordinator and still a frequent speaker for the 
Critical Legal Studies movement, has called the right to reproductive choice «a 
leftish sort of right which, it is said, leftists must recognize as not relative lest 
they lose their political credentials». Tushnet, «An Essay on Rights», 62 Texas 
L. Rev. 1363, 1365 (1984). Note, however, that Tushnet goes on to argue such 
a right would no longer make sense even to leftists in a society slightly diffe-
rent from our own. See also in/ra note 21. 
2. Quintano Ripollés, in his historical analysis of abortion legislation, is 
puzzled by the fact that at the political level European socialists have long ten-
ded to favor more elective abortion, despite the «individualism» he sees repre-
sented by su eh a position. He theorizes that past explicit use of anti-abortion 
laws to increase the armies and labor forces of capitalist nations may have caused 
socialists to oppose such laws. 1 would add that Left cornmitments to sexual 
equality could also point in this direction. But neither demographic decline nor 
women's equality seems necessarily to further the development of socialismo 1 
Tratado de Derecho Penal, Parte Especial, 504-05 (Madrid, 1962). 
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Not SO in European law. The important 1975 West German 
decision mandated laws against abortion from a dramatically 
communitarian perspective 3, as has been so ably pointed out by 
Donald Kommers 4. The Spanish Constitutional Court decision 
of 11 April 1985 s, which was strongly influenced by the Ger-
man one 6, is in many (but not aH) ways even more communita-
rian than that prior opinion. Indeed, it may not be too much to 
say that social constitutional jurisprudence in the West may 
weH find a landmark in this Spanish case. Socialism is relevant 
to abortion after aH, but in a way quite different from that 
which might superficiaHy have been expected. 
The key point, to be developed below, is that the Spanish 
court considers the fetus neither a person possessing rights, as 
U.S. pro-life people argue, nor subject to a person possessing 
rights, as pro-choicers argue. Instead, unborn life is treated as a 
3. Decision of 25 February 1975, [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1. Published as 39 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverlassungsgericht 1 (Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 
1975). Translated into English by Robert E. Jonas and John D. Gorby, «West 
German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade -with Commenta-
ries,» 9 John Marshall J. 01 Prac. and Proc. 551 (1976). 
4. Donald Kommers, «Abortion and Constitution: United States and West 
Germany», 25 Amer. J. Comp. L. 255,280-284 (1977) and «Liberty and 
Community in Constitutional Law: The Abortion Cases in Constitutional Pers-
pective» 1985 Brigham Young U. L. Rev. 371, 391-399. For a quite useful 
critique from an individualist perspective, see Hartmut Gerstein and David 
Lowry, «Abortion, Abstract Norms, and Social Control: The Decision of the 
West German Federal Constitutional Court» 25 Emory L. J. 849 (1976). 
5. Decison of 11 April 1985, STC 53/1985 (Pleno). The official version 
was first published in 119 Boletin Oficial del Estado [hereinafter BOE] 10 
(Suplemento, 18 mayo 1985) but I have hereinafter cited the clearer and per-
haps more accessible 1985-49 Boletin de Jurisprudencia Constitucional 
[hereinafter BJ C] 5 15. 
6. I do not believe this assertion to be controversial. The Spanish decision 
refers repeatedly to the German one in summarizing arguments of counsel. Id. 
at 521, 523, 526, 527. In the Comision de Justicia e Interior debates on 25 
February 1983, opposition leader Ruiz Gallardón referred to the government's 
repeated statements that German law had been an inspiration for the present 
abortion depenalization proposal. The responding J ustice Minister, Ledesma 
Bartret, did not dispute this assertion. Cortes Generales, Sesiones del Congreso 
de los Diputados, 11 Legislatura, Num. 18, 1983 at 6 ff. The Catholic newspa-
per Ya of 24 November 1984 referred in passing to German influence at the 
legislative and judicial levels. «El Tribunal podría exigir más garantías para 
proteger la vida en formación» (byline F. L. de P). According to Ernst Benda, 
former President of the Constitutional Court of West Germany, the Spanish 
Court itself has be en modeled on the German one. See «Constitutional Juris-
diction in West Germany», 19 Columbia J. Transnational L. 1 (1981). 
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distinct constitutionally protected legal good. The nature of this 
Spanish status of the fetus as apublic value will be elucidated 
in this commentary, and its status will be compared with that 
of unborn life according to the highest tribunal s of Germany 
and the United States. 
It will further be se en that the use of this value to require 
the prohibition of elective abortion is intimately linked in 
Spain, more explicidy than in Germany, with the communita-
rian ideal of the «Social State». U.S. constitutional doctrine, 
being much more individualist, might well not have required 
such a result even if the fetus had been recognized by our 
Supreme Court to have a very high public value. 
Yet the Spanish and German decisions contain a surprise: 
At the same time that they base the protection of fetal life on 
the importance of public values, they withdraw that protection 
when continuation of a pregnancy is «too much to demand» or 
«non-demandable» (<<inexigible» and «unzumutbar», in the 
words of the Spanish and German courts respectively) of the 
individual pregnant woman. 1 will point out that abortion in 
such hardship cases may come under a paradoxical category of 
penal theory in which individuals are legally justified (not 
merely excused) in doing that which from the standpoint of 
public legal values remains unjustified. This individualist doctri-
nal counterthrust may be just as important as the communita-
rian expansion occurring in the same Spanish abortion case. 
References to Germany and to the U.S. will again make 
this clear. 
Before turning to case analysis, however, it would be we11 
to define with greater precision the basic categories 1 have been 
and will be using: To the degree to whi.ch a «community» (or 
«socialism») exists, shared public values are effectively pursued 
by a11. As long as those values inhere in states of being rather 
than in conduct considered right in itself, rules are unimportant. 
For example, if neighbors were to gather to build a common 
barn, it would be silly to set down rules granting individual 
claim rights to hammers. There would no doubt be temporary 
rule-like guidelines provided, in order to aid coordination, but 
the common goal would be to use hammers wherever they are 
most needed. No individual would insist on getting his or her 
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prescribed tum with a hammer, if a neighbor could use it better 
for their shared purpose. 
By contrast, to the degree to which a society is «individua-
list», there are no public values. AH goals are personal and pri-
vate, and human beings interact only insofar as necessary in 
order for each to achieve his or her private values. Conse-
quentIy, rules are very important. For example, if a number of 
individuals are constructing their own separate bams, and there 
is a scarcity of tools, they will surely set down a set of rules 
for sharing hammers. These rules will differ from the temporary 
guidelines used by the neighbors aboye not only in their subs-
tance but also in their lack of flexibility. Private planning requi-
res certainty about rules, requires rights. This is particularly so 
if the others involved are competitors or even enemies, so that 
one is disinclined to relinquish a tum at the hammer even if 
one happens to have run out of nails. 
At a constitutional level, a court might impose one or the 
other of these models. It might insist that the State require aH 
to work together for a common goal (e .g. life), or it might insist 
that the State refrain from coordinating common pursuits, in 
order to further the private values of individuals. Or, of course, 
it might do neither and let the whole matter remain in the 
hands of legislatures. 
1. Chronology and Summary 01 the Decision 
Prior to the bill he re at issue, the Spanish penal code did 
not explicitIy exempt any abortions from punishment 7. How-
ever, the general defense of necessity includes an exemption for 
acts done to avoid harm equal to or greater than the harm 
caused 8, which would make non-punishable at least those abor-
tions necessary to preserve maternal tife 9. 
7. Codigo Penal arts. 411-417. Published as Codigo Penaly legislación 
complementaria (Madrid: Civitas, 1984). 
8. Codigo Penal arto 8 (7). . 
9. The supplemental brief of the anti-abortion petitioners (dated 3 January 
1983 [sic)) further states that in practice abortion was never punished when 
done for any of the reasons listed in the government's abortion depenalization 
bill, found infra note 11 and accompanying . texto Therefore, the brief argues, 
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Soon after the sweeping Partido Socialista Obrero Español 
(PSOE) electoral victory of 1982, which gave the party an 
absolute majority in the Spanish legislature, the new govern-
ment proposed an addendum to prior abortion law lO declaring 
abortion unpunishable in certain circumstances. As approved by 
the Congress of Deputies on 6 October 1983, and by the 
Senate on 30 November 1983, the bill read: 
«Abortion will not be punishable if performed by a physician, 
with the consent of the woman, when any one of the following 
circumstances is present: 
1. That it is ' necessary in order to avoid a serious danger 
to the life or health of the pregnant woman. 
2. That the pregnancy is the consequence of an act consti-
tuting the crime of rape under arto 429, provided that the 
abortion is performed within the first twelve weeks of gesta-
tion and that the aforementioned act has been reported. 
3. That it is probable that the fetus will be boro with 
serious physical or mental defects, provided that the abortion 
is 'performed within the first twenty-two weeks of gestation 
and that the unfavorable prognosis is registered in an opinion 
issued by two medical specialists other than the one operating 
on the pregnant woman» 11. 
The post-Franco Spanish Constitution of 1978 established 
statutory reform serves no purpose except to prepare the way for fully 
elective abortion. 
10. The addendum was to be inserted at the end of the existing sections on 
abortion and numbered «417 bis». 
11. This is a translation of the bill as it appears in the Constitutional 
Court's opinion STC 53/1985, de 11 de abril, as published in the BJe, supra 
note 5, at 531, which is slihgtly modified in capitalization and punctuation from 
the version earlier printed in the BOE, supra note 5. The Spanish is as 
follows: 
«El aborto no será punible si se practica por un médico, con el consenti-
miento de la mujer, cuando concurra alguna de las circunstancias siguientes: 
l. Que sea necesario para evitar un grave peligro para la vida o la salud de 
la embarazada. 
2. Que el embarazo sea consecuencia de un hecho constitutivo de delito de 
violación del artículo 429, siempre que el aborto se practique dentro de las 
doce primeras semanas de gestación y que el mencionado hecho hubiere 
sido denunciado. 
3. Que sea probable que el feto habrá de nacer con graves taras físicas o 
psíquicas, siempre que el aborto se practique dentro de las veintidós primeras 
semanas de gestación y que el pronóstico desfavorable conste en un dictamen 
emitido por dos médicos especialistas distintos del que' intervenga a la 
embarazada» . 
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for the first time a Constitutional Court with the power of judi-
cial review of statutes 12. Consistent with the Kelsenian Euro-
pean tradition, a petition alleging unconstitutionality may be 
interposed by certain authorized persons, without the need to 
await a concrete injury 13. A 1979 sub-constitutional law, repealed 
in 1985, further established the right of these same persons to 
insist that the Court hear such a petition before certain allegedly 
unconstitutional bills could enter into effect 14. 
On 2 December 1983, the latter sort of petition was filed in 
the name of fifty-four Deputies led by the conservative Alianza 
Popular party. After receiving a series of supplements and res-
ponses during the first half of 1984, the Constitutional Court 
finally announced its decision on 11 April 1985. 
The abortion reform bill was declared in certain details to 
be an unconstitutional violation of article 15 of the Constitu-
tion, which reads «All have the right to life and to physical and 
moral integrity ... » (<<Todos tienen derecho a la vida y a la inte-
gridad física y moraL.»). Although the twelve members of the 
Court were evenly divided for and against this declaration, 
Spanish practice in efTect permitted a second and tie-breaking vote 
to be cast by the President of the Court, Dr. Manuel García 
Pelayo y Alonso, and ex-soldier for the Spanish Republic who 
became an intemationally-known scholar during his years out-
side of Spain 15. 
12. The Court is made up of twelve members (four chosen by three-fifths of 
the Congress, four by threefifths of the Senate, two by the current government, 
and two by the General Council of the Judicial Power), as authorized by article 
159 (1) of the Constitution of 1978 [as found in Leyes políticas del Estado 
(Madrid: Civitas, 1984)]. Members are elected for nine-year terms, which are 
staggered over three-year cycles. Article 159 (3). 
. 13. Article 162 (1) (a) of the Constitutionof 1978. 
14. Organic Law of the Constitutional Court (Ley Orgánica 2/1979, de 3 
de octubre, del Tribunal Constitucional) article 79 (2). Repealed by Ley Orgá-
nica 4/1985, de 7 de junio (BOE numo 137, de 8 de junio). 
15. The vote was not exactly along socialist vs. conservative Iines. Of the 
six members of the «majority» , two were those nominated by the General 
Council of the Judicial Power. The Court's president had been approved by the 
PSOE. The remaining three were originally proposed by the old centrist party, 
the UCD, which virtually disappeared in the 1982 elections. The only woman 
on the court co-authored the resulting Court opinion. «El tribunal de los 12», 
El País, 12 April 1985, p. 13. Additional chronological and biographical 
details may be found on the same page. See also «Así votaron los doce magis-
trados», Ya, 12 April 1985, p. S, and Diario 16, 12 April 1985, pp. 6-7. 
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After a lengthy development of the arguments presented by 
the petitioners and by the governmental respondent, the Court 
builds its position on twelve «Legal Foundations» (<<Fundamen-
tos Jurídicos»), concluding with the holding of unconstitutiona-
lity. Five dissenting opinions, one of which is co-authored, 
follow. 
The Court's argument in brief paraphrase is this: Human life 
is a superior constitutional value (Legal Foundation, hereinafter 
L. F., 3) and a Social State such as Spain has an affirmative 
duty to secure it by law (L.F. 4). This life is a reality distinct 
from the mother from the beginning of gestation and, there-
fore, the «one to be born» (<<nasciturus»)16 must be conside-
red a «lega] good» (<<bien jurídico») accorded protection by 
the Constitution. Legislative history indicates that the framers 
of the Constitution intended this result (L.F. 5), even though 
neither Spanish nor international law requires the conclusion 
that the one to be born possesses a personal subjective right to 
this protection (LL.FF. 5, 6, and 7). Such protection must be 
effective and, if necessary, include penal sanctions, although it 
need not be absolute (L.F. 7). 
The Constitution also guarantees personal dignity, which 
includes rights such as free development of one 's personality, 
physical and moral integrity, and personal and family intimacy 
(L.F. 8). When constitutional values collide, the legislator must 
weigh them and try to harmonize them or, if necessary, to spe-
cify the conditions under which one may prevail. He must al so 
not forget the limits to what is reasonably demandable by the 
penal law. In carrying out his judgments, he need not turn only 
to the generalized exemptions from punishment found in article 
8 of the Penal Code, but may use a different technique for cer-
tain crimes such as abortion (L.F. 9). 
16. The Latin word «nasciturus» is here translated lite rally into English, 
despite the resultant oddity of speaking of the «one to be born» perhaps being 
aborted. «Fetus» would not be an acceptable alternative because the Spanish 
court had available, and elsewhere used, the equivalent «feto». Simply leaving 
the term untranslated would also not be appropriate, for the Latin word would 
not have the same feel in English as it would in Spanish. «Nasciturus» would 
connote a birth-related being to the educated Spanish reader, both because of 
its clear link to the Spanish «nacer» (<<to be born») and because of its most 
frequent use in civil law contexts where, in fact, the expectation of birth is 
uppermost in mind. . 
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After disposing of statutory vaguenessproblems -by indi-
cating, for example, that a «serious danger» is one which 
involves an important and permanent diminution of physical or 
mental hea1th (L.F. 10)- the Court applies the foregoing prin-
cipIes to the bill in question. There is nothing unconstitutional 
in permitting the destruction of unborn life where the mother's 
life is at stake. Given a «serious dangen> to her hea1th, the 
mother's own right to life and to physical integrity is affected; 
not to punish abortion here is constitutional, especially in light 
of what is demandable by penal law. Rape violates personal 
dignity in the highest degree, and the law clearly cannot 
demand that the victim bear its consequences. As for the case 
of serious physical or mental fetal defects, recourse to penal 
sanctions against abortion would impose conduct beyond that 
which is normally demandable of a mother (L.F. 11). 
The constitutionality of the non-punishment of abortion in 
such circumstances has thus been established, according to the 
Court. However, the State continues to have an obligation 
effectively to guarantee the life and health both of the woman 
and of the one to be born. It must, therefore, make sure that 
neither the former nor the latter is disprotected any more than 
may be required by those circumstances. For the protection of 
the woman, the State should provide that the abortion take 
place in public or private health centers authorized for this pur-
pose. For the protection of the one to be born, in order to be 
certain that the first type of circumstance (serious maternal life 
or health danger) exists, the Constitution demands that the opi-
nion of a medical specialist be obtained prior to the abortion. 
Similarly, the opinions of the two specialists regarding any fetal 
disabilities must be obtained in advance of any abortion. Such 
changes, without excluding other possible ones, would permit 
the bill finally to be enacted into law (L.F. 12) 17. 
17. The government did not delay in complying with the Court's demands. 
On 12 July 1985, a new enactment was published in the Boletín Oficial del 
Estado, number 166. (Ley Orgánica 9/1985, de 5 de julio, de reforma del artí-
culo 417 bis del Código Penal). The significant changes are as follows: The 
new law contains a preliminary paragraph requiring abortions to be done in an 
accredited health center, and requires a prior second medical opinion con-
firming that an abortion is necessary to avoid a serious danger to the life or 
health (which now explicitly includes mental health) of the pregnant woman. 
The law, however, does not require the second opinion (nor the woman's 
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In the last two sections of its opinion, the Court declines to 
require paternal participation in the abortions decision (L.F. 
13), or to enter into subsidiary civil law issues such as the 
relation of non-punishable abortion to social insurance. It does 
point out, though, that conscientious objection to abortion is 
protected by the Constitution (L.F. 14). 
2. Prenatal Lije as a Legal Value lor the Community 
The Constitutional Court of Spain finds that the one to be 
born has not been shown to possess any constitutional rights. 
At the same time, the fetus is protected by the Constitution, 
and indeed is protected by the sentence «AH have the right to 
life ... » Let us look more c10sely at the reasoning and results of 
these apparent1y contradictory findings by the Court. 
The idea that our objective legal duties necessarily corres-
pond to others' subjective rights is not universal 18 , being in the 
form we know it a development of late scholastic nominalism 19 
and Enlightenment individualismo Some cultures apparently have 
express consent) in an emergency. A new section indicates, in accordance with 
a . remark of the Court, that the pregnant woman will not be punished even 
when an (otherwise non-punishable) abortíon occurs in violation of the require-
ments of a health center or of confirming medical opinions. 
Regulations setting accreditation standards have become a focus of legal con-
troversy under the new law. 
18. See e. g. José Luis Lacruz Berdejo, «El Derecho Subjetivo», 3 Elemen-
tos de Derecho Civil, Parte General, 77-87 (Barcelona: Librería Bosch, 1984). 
See al so Stanley 1. Benn, «RightS», in 7 Encyclopedia 01 Philosophy 195 (New 
York: Macmillan, 1967), T. Benditt, Rights 3-8 (Rowman, 1982) and H. L. A. 
Hart, «Bentham on Legal Rights», Oxford Essays on Jurisprudence (second 
series), ed. A. W. B. Simpson, 171-202 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1973). 
The best short histories in English of the idea of a right may be John Finnis, 
Natural Law and Natural Rights 205-210 (Oxford University Press, 1980) 
and Martín Golding, «The Concept of Rights: A Historical Sketch», Bioethics 
and Human Rights, ed. E. L. Bandman and B. Bandman, 44-50 (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1978) and «Justice and Rights: A Study in Relationship», Jus-
tice and Health Ca re , ed. E. E. Shelp, 23-35 (Reidel, 1981). 
19. Prof. Michel Villey has defended the thesis that William of Ockham 
was among the first fully to conceptualize subjective rights over property. Ock-
ham did so, according to Villey, in order to permit the Franciscans more easily 
to renounce such rights and thus to fulfill their radical vows of poverty. At the 
same time as they renounced civil claims to property, they could continue to 
administer and to use it in a physical sense. See Michel Villey, «Droit subjec-
tif», Seize essais de philosophie du droit 140 (Paris: Dalloz, 1969). 
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no need to reify the benefits of the legal order and as cribe the 
ownership of these abstract benefits (primarily, the power to 
choose to make claims) to individual actors or subjects (whence 
«subjective»). Even today, we ordinarily think of the criminal 
law as a set of duties which do not respond to individual 
claims. 1 certainly have a duty not to steal from myneighbor, 
but only the State, not my neighbor, has the right to insist that 
1 not do so under pain of criminal sanction. Analytically, the 
idea that duties need not entail rights is defended by a number 
of philosophers today 20. The rise of socializing legal theory has 
also put pressure on the idea of individual claim rights as a 
foundation of the legal order 21 • 
The received European legal protections accorded to the 
fetus cannot easily be squeezed into this modern subjective 
rights ideology 22. Of the many nations following Continental 
traditions, apparently only Argentina has seen fit to acknow-
20. See e. g. the fine arguments and citations in Roslyn Weiss «The Perils 
of Personhood», 89 Ethics 66 (October, 1978), and in Stanley Hauerwas 
Truthlu/ness and Tragedy 174 ff and notes (University of Notre Dame Press, 
1977). See al so Joel Feinberg, Rights. Justice and the Bounds 01 Liberty 135-
39, 144 (Princeton University Press, 1980). 
The inverse proposition, that the absence of rights need not entail the 
absence of duties has been well and relevantly put in Montague, «Two Con-
cepts of Rights», 9 Phi/o and Pub. Alf 372, 384 (1980): 
1 suppose there is a sense in which 1 would deny that those incapable of 
acting intentionally have rights, but 1 do not see that doing so has any morally 
objectionable consequences. It isn't as if, for example, that by denying that 
infants have a right to self-defense 1 am sanctioning infanticide; what 1 have 
said he re implies only that the immorality of infanticide cannot be grounded on 
the rights of infants. Infanticide -as well as such things as cruelty to animals 
and non-therapeutic experimentation on the severely retarded- is immoral 
even if infants, animals, and the severely retarded have no (exercisable) 
rights. 
21. Lacruz Berdejo, supra note 18, at 85. See e. g. Karl Marx, «On the 
Jewish Question», Early Writings 211, especially 230-231 (New York: Ran-
dom House, 1975) and Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits 01 Justice 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982). The socialist Mark Tushnet 
(supra note 1) and Louis M . Seidman have explicitly argued for the permissibi-
lit y of fetal protection on a non-rights basis. «A Comment on Tooley's 'Abor-
tion and Infantice'», 96 Ethics 350 (January, 1986). 
Mirjan Damaska's comprehensive new treatise contrasting the reactive and 
the activist state is a particularly rich theoretical context within which to 
understand the relative absence of rights in socialist law. See The Faces 01 Jus-
tice and State Authority 83 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). 
22. Lacruz Berdejo, id ., at 93-94. 
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ledge civil personality from the moment of conception 23. The 
image of the person as a bargainer and a litigator indeed does 
not seem applicable to unborn life. Of course, children after 
birth likewise possess these traits of legal personality only in 
potentia, yet they are accorded personhood (though the exercise 
thereof is necessarily by a representative), so that the exclusion 
of fetuses remains problematic 24. In any event, prior to 1985 
many or most Spanish legal theorists granted the fetus a status 
lower than that of a person, perhaps even lower than that 
recognized in France or Italy 2S. 
Anti-abortion strategy during the constitutional debates if 
anything reenforced the non-personhood of the fetus. Fearful 
that the sentence «AH persons have the right to life ... » could be 
read to protect only those who under the civil code had perso-
nality, i. .e. those who had be en born and were able to survive 
twenty-four hours 26, opponents of abortion substituted the sen-
tence «AH have the right to life ... », for the explicit purpose of 
protecting the unborn from abortion 27. It became difficult for a 
23. Quintano Ripollés, supra note 2, at 477. But cf. Luis Jiménez de Asúa 
arguing that the fetus still does not count as a «visible person» under Argentirie 
law. 6 Tratado de derecho penal, second edition, 988 n. 36 (Buenos Aires: 
Losada, 1962). 
24. The existence of infant persons can support the assertion that potentia-
lit y is sufficient for personhood and therefore that the unborn are Iikewise 
Argersons. See Enciclopedia Jurídica Española 709. See al so John Rawls, A 
Theory 01 Justice 509 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard,rsons. See Enciclopedia 
Jurídica Española 709. See also John Rawls, A Theory 01 Justice 509 (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard,te 45 and accompanying text for the German high 
court's argumento Contrary resolutions are possible. It is common today for 
abortion-related philosophizing to end in approval of infanticide. See e. g. the 
authors Tooley and Warren cited by Weiss, supra note 20. 
25. Quintano Ripollés, supra note 2, at 471 ff. See also J. M. Rodríguez 
Devesa, Derecho penal español, seventh edition, Parte Especial, 100 n. 42 
(Madrid, 1979), arguing that feticide has never be en considered homicide. See 
generally E. Cuello Calon, 2 (2) Derecho Penal, thirteenth edition, 522 (Barce-
lona, 1972). Not all the juristic data is clear. For example, for civil purposes 
the prenatal child is conditionally considered born and the possessor of rights, 
provided that it eventually emerges viable from the womb. Código Civil arto 29. 
Published as Código Civil, eighth edition (Madrid: Civitas, 1984). In criminal 
law, the Penal Code prohibits consensual abortion under the title «Crimes 
against Persons» (<<Delitos contra las personas»), Código Penal, Título 
VIII. 
26. Código Civil, arts. 29-30. 
27. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso, Num. 105, 6 July 1978, at 3952 ff. 
See also the summary of these debates at L. F. 5 of the decision presently 
being considered. 
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court to say that a fetus is a constitutional person when the 
word «person» had been struck from the Constitution in order 
to ensure the inc1usion of fetuses. 
Thé Constitutional Court in fact does not argue the issue of 
legal personality as such. Instead, it considers the c10sely re-
lated (if not ultimately identical in modern law) issue of whether 
fetuses are «titulares», i. e. bearers or possessors, of a subjec-
tive constitutional right to life. It finds that they are not, a con-
clusion in accordance with the mainstream of Spanish legal 
tradition. 
The Court nevertheless was faced with the apparentIy una-
nimous opinion of Spanish medical associations that the unborn 
child is a living human being 28 • From the materials available, 
the government does not appear to have disputed the physical 
fact of human life prior to birth 29. Instead, it approached the 
issue wholly formalistically, arguing that legal norms are inde-
pendent of non -legal facts 30_ a hard position to take when it 
comes to documents like constitutions which are meant to limit 
the legal order for the sake of a socially preferred physical rea-
lit y . Moreover, the Court conceded that the substitution of 
«all» for «all persons» had been intended to protect nascent 
life. How could the Court conceptualize the legal status of 
living but unborn human beings? 
28. The petitioners submitted statements from various medical associations 
to this effect, and the government submitted none to the contrary, or at least 
none the Court thought worth mentioning. See BJC supra note 5 at 525. See 
also The Human Lije Bill-S. 158, Report to the Committee on the Judiciary, 
United States Senate, Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, 97th Congress 
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1981) arguing that there is a 
scientific consensus concerning the fact that Jife begins at conception but not 
concerning the value to be accorded to that Jife. The U. S. report was cited by 
the Spanish petitioners in their brief of amplification, dated 3 January 1983 
[sic), at 7. 
29. As far as I have been able to determine, most of the government briefs 
in the case are not available and were not made available even to opposing 
counsel. But the Court's extensive summary of the government arguments 
makes no mention of any dispute concerning the factual existence of a Jiving 
human organism prior to birth. 
30. In the one government brief which I have been able to obtain, a purely 
formal argument was advanced in response to petitioners' request for scientific 
testimony on the facts of human development prior to birth. «Law presents 
itself to the jurist as a primary phenomenon, with the ability to elaborate its 
own concepts and categories», according to the government brief of 11 April 
1984 at 4. 
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Traditional Spanish legal doctrine may have provided sorne 
help. Not all legal goods in Spanish law have to pertain to indi-
viduals, or even to the State, in the manner of property owner-
ship. Goods in the public domain and communal goods have 
long be en recognized 31. It has be en argued that society, rather 
than the fetus or the mother, is the «titular» of the protection 
accorded to the unborn child 32. Anti-abortion spokespersons 
had argued that even without a subjective right, the fetus may 
be protectable by an objective norm, as a «social good» 33. The 
Spanish Supreme Court (which does not have the power of 
judicial review nor of authoritative constitutional interpretation 
given to the Constitutional Court) indeed asserted in its deci-
sion of 11 January 1984 that 
Human life in formation is a good that constitutionally merits 
protection, is a constitutional legal good, a legal good of the 
community and not an individual legal goOd ... 34 • 
Even spokespersons for the right to abortion were willing to 
concede that the unborn are a legal good of the community 3S • 
Sorne interpreted such a concession to mean, however, that 
what the community possessed it could dispose of by its repre-
sentatives in the legislature, and thus that the legislative depe-
nalization of abortion was constitutionally permissible 36. Perhaps 
31. Lacruz Berdejo, supra note 18, at 42ff, especially 51-55. 
32. Quintano Ripollés, supra note 2, at 477, reports sorne support for all 
three possibilities. 
33. Diaz Fuentes calls the fetus a «social good», in Diario' de Sesiones del 
Congreso, Num. 105, 5 October 1983, at 2943. Osear Alzaga is cited by J. 
Cerezo Mir, in note 46 of his essay «La regulación del aborto en el proyecto de 
nuevo Código Penal Español» in La reforma penal (Madrid, 1982) to the etTect 
that the fetus is protected by an objective norm even without a subjective right. 
34. TS 2a Sala 15 octubre 1983, reported in La Ley 11 enero 1984 at 1. 
Reversed (in etTect) on other grounds by the Constitutional Court. TC 2a Sala 
75/1984, 27 de junio, reported in La Ley 24 octubre 1984 at 1. 
35. Sotillo Martí stated his agreement with the German high court that life 
in the womb is a legal good protected by the Constitution. Diario de Sesiones 
del Congreso de los Diputados, Sesiones informativas de Comisiones, Num. 
61, 7 septiembre 1983, at 2139. 
36. The article by Arroyo Zapatero discussed below at note 71 develops 
the idea that what the community gives, the community can take away. Luis 
Arroyo Zapatero «Prohibición del aborto y Constitución», Revista de la Facul-
tad de Derecho de la Universidad Complutense, numo 3, 195 (1980). The 
Constitutional Court's summary of the government arguments indicates that the 
latter admitted the existence of unborn life as a legal good, but claimed that the 
legislature had discretion over its protection. BJC, supra note 5 at 526-28. 
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for this reason, the anti-abortion briefs in this case resist the 
idea that the one to be born is only a legal good rather than a 
possessor of the right to tife 37. 
Like the Spanish Supreme Court in the quotation aboye, the 
Constitutional Court in effect takes the traditional concept of 
the unborn as a protected legal good and inserts it into the 
constitutional «system of values». (LL.FF. 3, 4, 9). Since the 
Constitution emanates from the community, it would seem 
(though the Constitutional Court does not use these precise 
words) that the unborn are a legal good or value «of the com-
munity». But because of the superiority of the Constitution to 
ordinary legislation, the community has in effect made a com-
mitment to the value of unborn tife such that it no longer 
retains a right freely to dispose of that tife by legislation. The 
community could also be seen to be simply acknowledging a 
preexisting and binding inherent value in such tife. In either 
case, one might say that the one to be born has become not so 
much a good «of» the community, in a proprietary sense, but a 
good «for» the community, a good at whose furtherance the 
community is aiming. 
It is worth pointing out that the very idea that there exists 
an objective order of values in a constitution is communitarian 
rather than individuatist, bacause it makes the Good at least in 
part pubtic rather than private. Such an order (i. e. not only a 
tist but also a hierarchy) of expticit and impticit values man-
dates not only a minimum set of formal rules which government 
and citizens must observe, but a set of goal s they must aim at 
particularly when combined with the idea of the Social State 
discussed later in this commentary. 
Within this value order, tife is not just any value, according 
to the Spanish Court, but is a «superior value» (L.F. 3), a 
Four of the dissenters to the final decision conceded that preborn life is or has 
sorne kind of legal value . . 
31. See e. g. the Court's summary, BJe, id. at 523, of petitioners' argu-
ment that life is a fundamental right or an absolute value rather than merely a 
legal good. Published antiabortist opinion had already rejected arguments like 
those of Arroyo Zapatero. See Federico Trillo-Figueroa (<<La legalización del 
aborto en el derecho comparado», at 113) and Fernando Díez Moreno (<<El 
proyecto de Ley del Aborto desde la perspectiva constitucional», at 181-89) in 
En defensa de la vida (Madrid: Editorial Edilibro, 1983). See also note 
71 infra. 
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«fundamental value» (L.F. 5), and a «centralvalue» (L.F. 9). 
The Court reaches this conclusion by noting that life is a pre-
supposition for aH other rights, and by reflecting upon the pla-
cement of the right to life at the head of the list of 
constitutional protections (L.F. 3). The unborn are taken to 
«embody» (L.F. 5) this value, both because the framers of the 
Constitution apparently intended the unborn to be protected by 
the right to life clause of that document, and because of the 
fact, noted by the Court, that human life is a «reality from the 
beginning of gestation». (L.F. 5). 
At the same time that the Court grants the fetus a high sta-
tus as a «constitutionaHy protected legal good» (L.F. 7), it 
balances its conclusion by refusing to consider the unborn to 
«possess» the right to life, as discussed above, and by the 
curious and unexplained remark that at birth, not before or 
after, the fetus acquires «fuH human individuality» (L.F. 5). 
Moreover, a careful reading of the opinion will show that the 
Court never explicitly acknowledges that the fetus is among the 
«all» referred to in the protective phrase «AH have the 
right to life ... » 
Let us try to understand this argument by means of an irre-
verent and slightly analogous hypothetical. Suppose the U.S. 
Constitution contained the foHowing language: «AH bald eagles, 
as the sacred symbol of the nation, have the right to life». Sup-
pose furtherthat the framers of this clause had inserted the 
word «aH» for the precise purpose of protecting embryonic 
eagles as weH as hatched eagles. Would we have to conclude 
that inside an egg is an eagle, or that a bird embryo has its 
own constitutional rights, in order to consider eagle eggs consti-
tutionalIy protected? 1 think noto Such protection could be founded 
simply on our sense that an important rneaning and purpose of 
the Constitution would be thwarted if eagle ornelettes carne into 
vogue. 
The precise effect of the Court's elevation of fetal value is 
this: The Court affirms the superiority, or even the equality, of 
the rnother's rights over the legal value of the fetus at most 
only in those situations covered in the first statutory depenali-
zation, i. e. where the mother's life or health is seriously 
endangered, both of which values are found in the same Consti-
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tutional article he Id to protect the unborn (L.F. 12). In order to 
uphold the other two depenalizations, the Court turns instead to 
the doctrine of non-demandability discussed at the end of 
this article. 
Perhaps even more importantly, the Court implicitIy holds 
that elective abortion is unconstitutional. It does so by indi-
cating that the obligaton to protect the fetus requires the State 
to make sure beforehand (by means of a second medical opin-
ion) that no abortions are done except where the mother is 
truly threatened. The exact content of the Court requirement is 
unimportant here. The point is this: If elective abortion were 
permissible, there would be no constitutional life-related value 
infringed upon even where an abortion were done outside the 
statutory provisions. By insisting that these provisions be 
strictIy enforced in order to protect the unborn, the Court has 
clearly he Id the complete depenalization of abortion to be 
unconstitutional 38 • As a fundamental public value, developing 
human life cannot be converted into purely private property. 
Not only did the Court manage to make this declaration in 
a case where elective abortion was not even an issue, but itdid 
so in a manner highly likely to be acquiesced in by the govern-
ment promoters of abortion depenalization. It asked only for 
tiny, technical additions to the bill, which were soon forthcoming. 
Had it done more, had it declared a broader right to life, the 
government might well have refused to go along, provoking a 
constitutional crisis 39. 
38. The Spanish court may to a degree have been inspired by similar lan-
guage in the 1975 Italian constitutional abortion decision, though the earlier 
phraseology would seem to appear in a procedural posture making it merely 
dictum: «[It] is the legislator's obligation .. . to forbid the procuring of an abor-
tion without careful ascertainment of the reality and gravity of injury or danger 
which happen to the mother as a re&ult of the continuation of pregnancy: 
Therefore the lawfulness of abortion must be anchored to a preceding evalua-
tion of the existence of the conditions which justify it». Carmosina et al. , 
Corte Costituzionale. Decision of February 18, 1975, No. 27 [1975] 20 Giur. 
Consto 117, as translated in Mauro Cappelletti and William Cohen, Compara-
tive Constitutional Law 612-14 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1979). 
39. Alfonso Guerra, vicepresidente of the PSOE government, on 26 March 
1985 (sixteen days before the Court announced its decision) declared that if its 
law were ruled unvalid, the government would be forced to set up a «machinery 
for pardons» for those obtainingabortions. The Court itself, he said, would be 
placed in «a socially difficult situation», and he expressed regret that twelve 
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One essential element in the Court's argument aboye has 
not yet been fulIy explored - the idea that in a Social State 
constitutional values form not only negative limits to govern-
mental action but also mold the required affirmative content of 
that action. This element has be en postponed in order to deve-
lop more elearIy the idea that the fetus has constitutional value 
in the first place, that the Spanish Constitution contains com-
mon public values (here unborn life) rather than only the rights 
of individuals. After a much briefer look at how Germany and 
the U. S. conceive the fetus, and sorne critical remarks of my 
own, we shalI return to this postponed discussion of the interac-
tion of fetal value and the Social State. 
The 1975 West German Constitutional Court decision on 
abortion bears a striking resemblance to the 1985 Spanish 
ruling -not surprisingly since, as mentioned previously, the for-
mer served in many ways as a model for the latter. 
Focus,ng upon the constitutional language «Everyone has 
the right to life ... », (<<Jeder hat das Recht auf Leben ... »)4O the 
German Court finds it unnecessary to hold the unborn child to 
be a person, or a «bearer» of a subjective right 41, in order to 
inelude it withim the protection of the Basic Law. Note, how-
ever, that the Court does not shy away from referring to the 
unborn 's «right to life». It avoids only the question of whether 
the child is the «bearer» (or «possessor») of this right. Perhaps 
the Court is thinking of analogous positive constitutional wel-
fare «rights» for adults which need not necessarily give rise to 
individual elaims presentable in a court. To return to our 
hypothetical, a similar analysis would find that bald eagles need 
not have civil law personality with access to courts in order to 
receive constitutional protection. Both this right-to-life guaran-
tee and the explicit constitutional value of «human dignity» 42 
non-elected persons should impede the will of 350 elected ones. He went on to 
oppose the separation of powers, calling it a relic of the epoch of Montesquieu, 
and promised to reform the norms goveming the Court. These statements placed 
the justices under «intolerable pressure» according to the opposition parties. 
ABe 12 abril 1985 at 53. The Court's elegant self-defense reminds one of 
Marbury v. Madison 5 U. S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
40. Basic Law (Grundgesetz) Article 2, section 2, Sentence 1. 
41. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 41. See al so the full translation of the German 
decision by Jonas and Gorby, supra note 3 at 641-42. 
42. Basic Law, Article 1, Section 1, Sentence 1. Note that the Spanish 
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leads the Court to rule that all human life, including prenatal 
life, is part of the «objective ordering of values» of the Basic 
Law 43 • Even the dissent agrees that the State has a constitutio-
nal duty to protect unborn life, and indeed states that the exis-
tence of this duty is «uncontested» ( «unbestritten» ) 44 
-arguing further, however, that the duty need not be imple-
mented by criminal sanctions. 
The German decision is somewhat more «pro-life» in its 
reasoning than the Spanish. Like the Spanish, it notes that 
human life is a continuum, but unlike the Spanish it does not 
see «full human individuality» occurring at birth. It states 
The process of development... is a continuing process which 
exhibits no sharp demarcation and does not allow a precise 
division of the various steps of development of the human life. 
The process does not end even with birth; the phenomena of 
consciousness which are specific to the human personality, for 
example , appear for the first time a rather long time after 
birth. Therefore, the protection ... of the Basic Law cannot be 
limited either to the «completed» human being after birth or 
to the child about to be born which is independently capable 
of living 4S. 
Moreover, it specifically holds that the constitutional word 
«everyone» includes «everyone living» 46 and that no distinction 
can be made, with regard to the right to life, between unborn 
constitutional equivalent here (Article 10, Section 1, Sentence 1) refers to «the 
dignity of the person» rather than to «human dignity» and played only a minor 
role in the Madrid decision. 
43. (1975) 39 BVerefGE 1, 41; Jonas and Gorby translation, supra note 3 
at 642. For discussion, see Gerstein and Lowry, supra note 4, at 862, 867 and 
materials there cited. 
44. (1975) 39 BVerfGE 1, 68 (abweichende Meinung); Jonas and Gorby , 
id . at 663 (dissent). 
45. (1975) 39 BVerfGE 1, 37; Jonas and Gorby, id. at 638. The Court 
appears to reason that as long as we protect newborn infants, whose human 
development is significantly incomplete, consistency requires protection prior to 
birth. Indeed, consistency requires a theory of protection which either values 
organic human life itself or else values the developing potentiality for higher 
«phenomena specific to the human personality» - for these are the only sour-
ces of inherent value which the infant possesses at birth . In other words , the 
Court argues that if we think newborns inherently worthy of protection, our 
normative theories require us al so to protect life even in the early we.eks of 
pregnancy. See further discussion infra text accompanying notes 66-74. 
46. Id. 
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and born life 47. Thus it could be argued that in Germany the 
fetus is in all but name constitutionally a person with rights, 
and so is closer than in Spain to being a full legal bearer of 
subjective rights. Or, put another way, Germany is more indivi-
dualist and Spain more communitarian in their respective ratio-
nales for deference to unborn life. 
Another way to understand the two decisions, however, 
would be to note that both call the one to be bom a «legal 
value» or a «legal good» (<<Rechtsgut», «bien jurídico») rather 
than an individual possessing rights, although the German lan-
guage is stronger conceming the high rank of that objective 
legal value. In both nations, unbom human life is an object 
more than a subject of constitutional protection, is a public 
value of the community rather than a private claim of the fetus 
or of the mother 48 • The German Court's further concem with 
government teaching and counseling in support of prenatal life 
also has a strongly communitarian ethos behind it 49. The Court 
clearly hopes to build a common value commitment rather than 
only a balance of individual interests . 
The explicit result of such fetal value recognition in Ger-
many, like that implicit in Spain, is a holding that elective 
abortion is unconstitutional, even in the first three months of 
gestation 50. New life, the next generation unbom, is the concem 
47. Id . 
48. But note that the German court, despite its use of value terminology, 
insists that such value cannot be aggregated, that each particular life must be 
protected ~ even if the sacrifice of sorne could lead to the preservation of a 
greater number . [1975) 39 BVerfGE 1,58-59; Jonas and Gorby, id. at 655-56. 
The reCusal to aggregate is a departure from ordinary valuing and is more at 
home in discourse informed by rights . 
Are there ways to avoid the ruthlessnes of valuing, its common callousness 
toward particulars , without appealing to the selfishness of rights? 1 believe there 
are, in the ideas of respect or reverence (which perhaps may be the deep 
grounds of the German decision). See my critique of valuing, «Toward Free-
dom from Value», 38 The Jurist 48 (1978), and my brief critique of rights in 
«Thinking about Ecology», XLV (1) The Cresset 7 (1981). 
49. [1975) 39 BVerfGE 1, 50, 57-58, 61-64; Jonas and Gorby, id. at 649, 
651-55, 657-60. For an excellent introduction to the German constitutional 
jurisprudence of values, see Ernst Benda, «New Tendencies in the Development 
of Fundamental Rights in the Federal Republic of Germany», 11 John Marshall 
J. of Prac. and Proc. 1, 6-9 (1977). Dr. Benda at that time was president of 
the Constitutional Court. 
50. [1975) 39 BVerfGE 1, 68; Jonas and Gorby, id. at 662-63 . 
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in sorne sense of the whole community, not only of individual 
pregnant women. Nevertheless, as in Madrid, the Court in 
Karlsruhe moderates the force of this conclusion by holding 
that there are limits to what the community can ask individuals 
to contribute to this common value, and that as a result laws 
may permit abortion in various situations of relative hardship SI. 
This individualist counterthrust will be examined further 
below. 
The 1973 U. S. Supreme Court abortion decision, Roe v. 
Wade, is in surprisingly many ways similar to the Spanish and 
German decisions. Like them, although much more strongly, it 
refuses to acknowledge constitutional personhood or rights pos-
sessed by the unbom S2. And just after its finding of non-
personhood, in a largely unnoticed portion of its decision, our 
Court creates a legal category very similar to that into which 
the fetus is placed in those European opinions: non-personal 
human life. That is, the U.S. court indicates that its conclusion 
of non-personhood does not yet dispose of the contention that 
there is a compelling state interest in protecting life from the 
moment of conception. It does not respond to this contention 
by arguing that there would be no decisive state interest in pro-
tecting such non-personal life, should it exist, but rather by 
indicating the Court's doubts as to whether the fetus is actually 
human and alive in an extraconstitutional sense S3. Presumably, 
had the Court been sure of the existence of a living human 
fetus, it would have found a strong public concem for fetal pro-
tection, similar to that found by the Spanish and German 
courts. In other words, the U. S. court creates the same cate-
gory (non-personal life imbued with a high public value) 
brought forth by those other tribunal s , but then fails to fill 
it. 
It may well be this single difference, not a difference of 
51. Very roughly speaking, the Court indicates that abortion need not be 
punished where the mother's tife or health is at stake, or she has been raped, 
or the child will sutTer from a serious health impairment, or she labors under 
some equivalent social hardship - inasmuch as each of these situations may 
make a continuation of pregnancy not demandable by means of the penal law. 
[1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 48-50; Jonas and Gorby, id. at 647-49. 
52. Roe v. Wade 410 U. S. 113, 156-58 (1973). 
53. Id. at 159-62. See also note 55, inlra. 
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constitutional categories but a disagreement about the fact of 
actual human life, which accounts for the tremendously dispa-
rate conclusions on abortion on the two sides of tha Atlantic. 
For it is not only Spain and Germany which agree that human 
life exists prior to birth. The other four European constitutional 
courts which have considered the matter appear to have rea-
ched this same conclusion 54, and none has subsequently seen fit 
54. The cryptic French Opln10n (permitting the legislature to leave most 
early abortions unpunished) contains the phrase «Considering that the law (per-
mitting abortion] referred to this Conseil Constitutionnel does not authorize 
any violation of the principIe of respect for every human being and none has 
subsequently seen fit to recognize a from the very commencement of life ... 
except in case of necessity ... » Decision of 15 January 1975, [1975] A.J.D.A. 
134, astranslated in Cappelletti and Cohen, supra note 38, at 577-78. For a 
different interpretation of the French decision, see H. Patrick Glenn, «The 
Constitutional Validity of Abortion Legislation: A Comparative Note», 21 
McGill L. J. 673, 677 and accompanying notes (1975). The Italian decision 
referred to in note 38 supra observes that Article 2 of the Constitution guaran-
tees the inviolable rights of man, «among which must be placed, although with 
the particular characteristics unique to it, the legal situation of the foetus ['con-
cepito']», at 613 of the translation, and later emphasizes obligatory protection 
for «the life of the foetus ['feto']», at 614, even while declaring that an embryo 
is not yet a person, at 613, and that abortions for serious maternal health rea-
son s must be permitted. Corte Costituzionale, Decision of 18 February 1978, 
n. 27 [1975] 98 Foro It. I (Giurisprudencia Costituzionale e Civile) 515, 516. 
Even the Austrian decision, which alone holds that fully elective abortion in the 
first three months of pregnancy is constitutional, seems to concede «that 
throughout the whole duration of the pregnancy both the mother's life and the 
nascent human life constitute constant life» (<<das s wahrend der ganzen Dauer 
der Schwangerschaft sowohl das Leben der Mutter als auch das werdende 
menschliche Leben gleichbleibendes Leben darstellen»), stating that the legisla-
ture is constitutionally free to protect the fetus by making abortion punishable, 
and is required to do so after viability if post-natal infanticide is punishable. 
Decision of 11 October 1974, Constitutional Court, [1974] Erklaerungen des 
Verfassungsgerichtshofs 221, 234-35 G 8/74, as translated by Cappelletti and 
Cohen, supra note 38, 615, 620-21. The Portuguese decision of 19 March 
1984 unanimously holds that the constitutional principie of the inviolability of 
human life embraces «intrauterine human life» , even though it goes on to 
declare a limited disprotection of that life to be constitutional. 344 Boletim do 
Ministerio da Justica 197, 216, 230 (March, 1985). Thus all four other Euro-
pean national decisions appear to recognize actual rather than only potential 
human life in the unborn and to permit and even to require some measure of 
constitutional protection for that life, with the precise degree of protection left 
largely up to the legislature. See generally H. Reis, Das Lebensrecht des Unge-
borenen Kindes als Verfassungsproblem (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1984). 
Professor Mary Ann Glendon's forthcoming work Abortion and Divorce in 
Western Law (Harvard University Press, 1987) [formerly entitled «Story and 
Language in American Law»] surveys the abortion laws of twenty Western 
nations and finds them all to be more sympathetic than Roe to fetal life 
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to recognize a constitutional right to abortion in any way as 
sweeping as that of Roe v. Wade. By and large, abortion has 
been left by them in the legislative domain. 
Yet although the Roe majority does not consider the unborn 
child to be human and alive, it holds that the fetus does have 
sorne public value, not as life but as «potential life» 55. One 
might say that Europe considers the unborn child to be a living 
human being, albeit only a potential legal person, while the 
United States treats it as only a potential lije. Nevertheless, 
there is sorne functional similarity to these two concepts, in 
that both recognize the fetus to be a value worthy of public 
concem, as a «legal good» and as a «state interest» respectively. 
But let us not forget that the Spanish and German decisions 
did not rest with the affirmation that the fetus is a «legal 
good». Those opinions tied unborn life to the order of constitu-
tional values, while Roe did not. Perhaps the U. S. court could 
have done otherwise. While our constitutional doctrine does not 
acknowledge a full-blown hierarchy of values apparent or hidden 
in our Constitution 56, the Supreme Court has gone beyond lit-
eral application of a set of unconnected rules. It has discerned 
the value of «privacy», for example, albeit linking this value to 
individual rights. Could our Court have looked at the various 
direct and indirect references to life in our fundamental law in 
order to give at least sorne attenuated constitutional status to 
what it calls «potential life»? Or would such a communitarian 
commitment to values be too alien to our focus on rights? In 
any event, in portions of Europe prenatal life has become 
something the State must respect, whereas in America it is only 
55. Roe v. Wade 410 U. S. 113 calls the fetus, e. g., «potential Jife» (at 
150, 154), «prenatal Jife» (at 151, 155), «potential human life» (at 159), «only 
the potentiaJity of Jife» (at 162), «fetal Jife» (at 163), and «the potentiality of 
human Jife» (at 162, 164) - the last referring to the period after viability. It 
also states «We need not resolve the difficult question of when Jife begins» (at 
159), and « ... a legitimate state interest need not stand or fall on the accep-
tance of the beJief that Jife begins at conception or at sorne other point prior to 
Jive birth» (at 150). Putting all this together, one gathers that the Court does 
not know whether «Jife» (in the sense of «human Jife») exists prior to birth, but 
its potentiaJity does in the form of «prenatal» or «fetal» Jife. 
56. But cf. Walter Murphy's attempt to construct such a system around the 
idea of «human dignity» . «An Ordering of Constitutional Values», 53 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. 703, 744ff (1980). Cf. also the works of Profs. Lawrence Tribe and 
Frank Michelman. 
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something the State may respect, even in the last moments 
before birth 57. 
Roe, then, treats the unborn as the object of no community 
commitment at the constitutional level, and as only the optional 
object of such a commitment at the legislative level. And even 
the latter option is sharply limited. The state interest in poten-
tial life without consitutional status fails entirely prior to viabi-
lit y , when confronted with a pregnant woman's right to 
privacy 58. And even in the last period before birth, where the 
state 's interest is nominalIy «compelling» 59, it cannot compel 
mucho Abortions destructive of the fetus must be permitted, 
even just before birth, if they promote what the Court calIs 
«health» 60 but which it defines broadly to include virtualIy 
every significant reason a woman might have for a third trimes-
ter abortion 61. Donald Kommers, in contrasting the American 
and German cases, has weil described the outcome in outcome 
in our 'country: 
«A woman is thus entitled to separate herself from the com-
munity while the community is rendered powerless to act in 
its common defense for the purpose of safeguarding shared 
values» 62. 
57. Even after viability, the fetus need be protected bythe State only «[if] 
the State is interested in protecting fetal life» Roe at 163, and «if it chooses» 
id. at 164-65. 
58. Prior to viability, abortion can be limited only in the interest of mater-
nal health, not in the interest of fetal life. Id. at 163-64. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 165. The recent Supreme Court decision of Thornburgh v. A. C. 
O. G. 106 S. Ct. 2169,2183, 90 L. Ed. 2d 779, 799 (1986) [interim editions] 
reemphasizes that even after viability, there cannot be «any 'trade-otT' between 
the woman's health and additional percentage points of fetal survivab. 
61. Roe's companion case, which should be «read togethen> with the former 
(according to Roe at 165), defines «health» to be related to «aH factors ... rele-
vant to the well-being of the patient». Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, 192 
(1973). The Thornburgh Supreme Court opinion, id., does not refer to this 
definition, but the court of appeals did so in the decision under review. That 
decision states «It is clear from the Supreme Court cases that 'health' is to be 
broadly defined. As the Court stated in Doe v. Bolton, the factors relating to 
health include those that are 'physical, emotional, psychological, familial, [as 
well as] the woman's age' [quoting from Doe]». The court of appeals goes on 
to say that a law which punished postviability abortions which were done to 
avoid the «potential psychological or emotional impact on the mother of the 
unborn child's survival» would be clearly unconstitutional. 737 F.2d 283, 
299 (1984). 
62. Kommers, «Abortion and Constitution», supra note 4 at 282. 
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The Roe result mandating elective abortion virtually throughout 
pregnancy could hardly be more at odds with the Spanish and 
German decisions forbidding elective abortion even in early 
pregnancy. And that results is likewise far from that reached by 
other European nations which, given the very great but non-
personal public value of prenatal life, leave the matter of abor-
tion almost entirely up to the legislature 63. 
How much likelihood is there that U . S. law on abortion 
might someday approach the mainstream of Western jurispru-
dence? Perhaps quite a bit. Justice O'Connor's dissent in the 
1983 Akron case indicates a desire to find a compelling state 
interest in protecting the fetus throughout pregnancy, though 
there is no evidence she would recognize constitutional person-
hood prior to birth 64 . If she were to ground her position not 
merely on justices' sense of the weight of potentiality but on 
the fact and value of actual life or of the constitutional dignity 
even of potential life, then the two sides of the Atlantic would 
draw much nearer to each other. 
3. Critique ofPrenatal Lije as a Legal Value 
Individual rights for fetuses are not the only alternative to 
individual rights for pregnant women. Community concern for 
unborn human life provides another way to look at the abortion 
problem, a way which I personally find superior 6S. If you and I 
recognize someone's rights, we are not bound by love to him or 
her, nor do we feel between ourselves a bond of fellowship. By 
contrast, if we jointly commit ourselves to caring for another, 
the basis is laid both for affection for the object of our concern 
63 . See supra note 54. 
64. City 01 Akron v. Akron Center lor Reproductive Health, 462 U. S. 
416, 459-466 (1983). She reaffirmed her position, again in dissent, in Thorn-
burgh, 106 S. Ct. 2169 at 2214, 90 L. Ed. 2d 779 at 836-37. 
65. So 1 have argued in «A Critique of Abortion Rights», 3 (4) democracy 
60 (fall, 1983), and by implication in my broad attack on rights entitled «A 
Critique of Fairness», 16 Valparaiso Univ. L. Rev. 459 (1982). See also my 
«Generosity: A Duty without a Right», in which 1 further explore the nature of 
rightless relations among persons. Paper presented to the Conference on Law 
and the Ordering of our Life Together (New York, April 1987). But cf. my 
reservations concerning the «value» approach to human dignity in the article 
cited supra at the end of my note 48. 
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and for community among ourselves. The Spanish and German 
attitudes toward the unborn are much closer than the official 
rightsbased positions of U. S. pro-lifers or pro-choicers to the 
actual feelings of parents for very young children. Parents feel 
infants neither to be their private property nor to be individuals 
negotiating their rights at arms' length. Instead and for many 
years, a baby is the shared value of a common life. 
Yet this new perspective does not answer the question of 
how great a weight the child has before and after birth, in ordi-
nary experience or in the law. And here 1 submit there is an 
antinomy for which there may well be no solution. 
On the one hand, in early pregnancy, often the fetus is not 
sensed to be present as a separate entity, and abortion is not 
felt to be a kind of homicide 66 • On the other hand, a newborn 
infant is considered a human being, and so is felt to possess 
what the German decision calls «inherent» (<<selbtstandigen») 
worth 67. That is, the value of the newborn is perceived to be 
inherent in its being, and not in the eyes of the parental or juri-
dical beholders. 
How can these two perceptions be squared with each other? 
Obviously, by the assumption that the neonate is a different 
being from the preborn fetus. The change in being could be 
thought to come either from a qualitative biological leap or 
from the infusion of a spiritual soul, or from both. 
Our modem quandary arises because we can no longer 
publicly affirm either basis for this assumption of discontinuity 
in being 68. Human life, according to modern science, is a conti-
nuum and, as the German court notes, those traits (e. g. self-
consciousness) for which many especially value our species do 
not arise until quite some time after birth. Neither can religion 
66. Quintano Ripollés, supra note 2 at 503, asserts that this is gene rally 
the case, at least as of 1962 (the year of that edition of his treatise). 
67. (1975) 39 BVerfGE 1, 67; Jonas and Gorby, supra note 3 at 662. 
68. Justice Stevens' recent «pro-choice» concurrence in the Thornburgh 
case , 106 S. Ct. 2169 at 2188, 90 L. Ed. 2d 779 at 805, demonstrates both 
the importance and the futility oC such a claim of discontinuity. He there 
asserts that the permissibility of abortion hinges upon there being «a fundamen-
tal and wellrecognized difference between a fetus and a human being» but fails 
even to hint at any grounds for such a distinction . 
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be the ground of a presumed change of being, in a pluralistic or 
secular society. 
Thus the belief in and commitment to the inherent value of 
life after birth requires in our day (but did not require in that 
of our great grandparents) significant protection for the child 
before birth 69 - because our law can no longer cogently pro-
claim that there is a difference in kind between the bom and 
the unbom. To put the matter another way, if we as a legis-
lating community permit relatively casual abortion we have reJ"l-
dered non-credible our commitment to the inherent value of 
every human being even after birth. 
Yet at the same time, as private individuals involved with 
early pregnancies, we may contine not to feel the presence of 
. another human life. Consequently, abortion may seem morally 
permissible, and our main concem with the law may be not get-
ting caught. 
There is one obvious way to cope with such dissonance: 
strong nominal legal protection for prenatal life coupled with 
large numbers of unlawful abortions 70. Other solutions, which 
grant the fetus sorne kind of intermediate or compromise status 
are trying to mix oil and water. They are in harmony neither 
with the intuition that the newbom's value is great and inherent 
nor with the intuition that early abortionconcems the pregnant 
woman alone. 
A brilliant and influential article by Arroyo Zapatero 71 , 
69. And indeed throughout pregnancy, according to the argument of the 
German court, supra note 45. 
70. The model of nominal iIIegality can be seen as a version of «excuse» 
reasoning on abortion, which is discussed at greater length infra under the 
heading «The Doctrine of 'Too Much to Demand'». Guido Calabresi's works 
emphasize the frequent usefulness of a difference between the law as ideal and 
the law in practice, e. g. Idea/s, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law 88 (Syracuse 
University Press, 1985) where he contrasts the official prohibition of euthanasia 
with actual jury practice. 
71. Arroyo Zapatero, supra note 35. The abortion decision of the Audencia 
de Bilbao of 24 March 1982 treats fetal Jife as a cultural value of the commu-
nity . According to Santiago Mir Puig (<<Aborto, estado de necesidad y Consti-
tución», 1982 Revista Jurídica de Cata/uña 1043, 1048, n. 1), this 
foundations for fetal protection entered Spain with Arroyo Zapatero's artic\e 
and was then picked up by the Bilbao court. (But cf. the very similar argument 
of F. Bueno Arius, pubJished in «Una nota sobre el aborto», Boletín de Infor-
mación del Ministerio de Justicia, numo 1.116, 15 December 1977). The arti-
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which appeared in Spain in 1980, attempts to cut this Gordian 
Knot. There he proposes that concern for unborn life, wherever 
and to the extent it exists, be treated as a kind of cultural 
value of the community 72. Such life would receive protection 
not for its own sake, but for the sake of the community which 
cares about it - in a manner reminiscent of Lord Oevlin's pro-
hibition of homosexual activity in order to promote community 
moral solidarity 73, and of the common suggestion that we pre-
vent cruelty to animals not to protect them but to protect 
human society's sensibilities. In very early pregnancy, where 
such felt concern is minimal at best and important maternal 
rights are at stake, few if any prohibitions on abortion would be 
appropriate 74. Under Arroyo's approach, we need not seek to 
harmonize pre- and post- natal intuitions about life, because 
only those intuitions (and not life itself) are being valued. 
Arroyo's solution fails because we as legislators, as scho-
lars, and as judges are not ourselves outside the community. 
We are not simply concerned with promoting sorne etl,tnic soli-
darity or sensibility which we do not share. We are members of 
the community which values human life, and as such are con-
cerned with truly protecting that which we value - not with 
affirming the value of our irrational valuing. Someone from 
Mars might like us enough to want to preserve us in aH our 
contradictory splendor, but we ourselves feel compeHed by 
honesty to find ways to resolve rather than to uphold our 
contradictions. 
Our belief in inherent postnatal human worth cannot logi-
caHy coexist with lawful elective or nearly elective abortion, 
but neither can logic alone induce women in distress to avoid 
abortion. Perhaps that belief will disappear someday, or be pushed 
back to sorne point where a qualitative change (rather than 
only a change in location, as at birth) takes place in young 
cle was a focus of attack in the anti-abortion publication En defensa de la 
vida, in the articles by Federico Trillo-Figueroa and by Fernando Díez-
Moreno, supra note 37. The latter attack on Arroyo Zapatero's thesis (though 
without the mention of his name) is repeated almost verbatim in the initial peti-
tioners' brief of 2 December 1983 at 38ff. 
72. Supra note 35 at 209ff. 
73. See gene rally Patrick Devlin. The Enforcement of Morals (London: 
Oxford University Press. 1965). 
74. Supra note 35 at 217ff. 
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human beings -say at self- consciousness, or at puberty. In 
that case, we could hold to the inherent value of the latter new 
kind of being but refuse to push that value forward to infantil e 
or prenatal stages of tife. Or technical developments such as 
ultrasound may in effect create windows in the womb, so that 
the intuition of inherent value can occur and have a moral 
effect on pregnant women even in the early months of preg-
nancy. But unless we evolve in one of these two ways, I cannot 
foresee a wholly satisfactory solutions to the law's abortion 
dilemma. 
4. The Court and the Social State 
This commentary is presently concerned to understand the 
contrasting degrees of pubtic value recognized in prenatal tife in 
Spain, Germany, and the United States. We have analyzed and 
critiqued the various attempts to conceptuatize the fetus as 
something other than a constitutional person or private pro-
perty. We now turn to another important way in which Spain 
~nd Germany are more communitarian than the U.S. in their 
treatment of fetal tife as a constitutional value. 
The classical conception of fundamental constitutional rights 
is that of rights against the State. A right to free speech would 
mean, for example, that the State cannot punish an individual 
for the content of what he or she has said. But that right alone 
would not, say, give an employee a right not to be punished for 
speaking by an employer. A constitutional right which were 
construed to protect an employee in this circumstance, possibly 
via a civil damage action, would have Drittwirkung, efficacy 
against third parties. 
The right to free speech might, however, be construed still 
more broadly. It, and other related constitutional provisions, 
could be found to be simply specifications of a deeper affirma-
tive vision ·of the good society. In this hypothetical case, that 
value could be taken to be free and open discussion. From that 
value, new specific rights could be derived, e. g. the right to 
read as well as to speak whatever one wished, with or 
without Drittwirkung. 
Even more, a court could hold that neither the old nor the 
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new rights qua rules are what is essential. What really matters 
is that there be in the end an effective promotion of free and 
open discussion, that the whole community in aH its legislation 
and activity work together for the sake of that shared ultimate 
value. So, for example, a state might be given the duty to sub-
sidize smaH presses, or criminaHy to penalize private censorship, 
or to teach openmindedness, or otherwise to act affirmatively in 
ways which a constitutional court thought would be effective in 
promoting free and open discussion. 
This latter communitarian visio is c10sely related in the 
Spanish decision to the constitutional demand for a «Social 
State» 75. Although the same ideas are clearly at work in the 
German court's insistence that the State affirmatively protect 
prenatal life, the Spanish opinion is noteworthy for the concise-
ness of its vis ion and the clarity of its «social» label and lin-
kage. Legal Foundation 4 reads in part: 
«It is also pertinent to make ... sorne references to the scope, 
meaning and function of fundamental rights in the constitutio-
nalism of our da y ins pired by the social Sta te of La w ... [F ]un-
damental rights do not include only subjective defense rights 
of individuals against the State... but al so positive duties on 
the part of the latter (see in this respect arts. 9.2, 17.4, 18.1 
and 20.3 and 27 of the Constitution). But, in addition, funda-
mental rights ... are the legal expression of a system of values 
that, by decision of the framers, has to inform the whole legal 
and political organization ... Consequently, from the obligation 
of all powers to submit to the Constitution, one deduces not 
only the negative obligation of the State not to injure the indi-
vidual or institutional sphere protected by these fundamental 
rights, but also the positive obligation to contribute to the 
effectiveness of such rights, and of the values that they repre-
sent, even when a subjective claim does not exist...» 76 
75. Article 1.1. reads in part «Spain is constituted as a social and demo-
cratic State of Law ... » (<<España se constituye en un Estado social y democrá-
tico de Derecho ... ») Other articles further this demando Artic1e 9.2 emphasizes 
effectiveness as a constitutional requirement. 
76. The Spanish Legal Foundation 4, as found in BJe, supra note 5, at 
532, reads in ful1: 
4. Es también pertinente hacer, con carácter previo, algunas referencias al 
ámbito, significación y función de los derechos fundamentales en el constitucio-
nalismo de nuestro tiempo inspirado en el Estado social de Derecho. En este 
sentido, la doctrina ha puesto de manifiesto -en coherencia con los contenidos 
y estructuras de los ordenamientos positivos- que los derechos fundamentales 
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Such a conception is socialist rather than individualist 
because in it the State must take responsibility for the societal 
results of its laws, rather than simply setting down minimum 
rules of conduct and letting the strong work within those rules 
to exploit the weak for the sake of private interests. 
It should not be forgotten that the issue in Spain was whether 
or not abortion must be penalized. Affirming the high constitu-
tional value of unborn life, indeed even affirming fetal person-
hood, might not be in itself sufficient to do more than forbid 
State-sponsored abortions and, of course, allow (rather than 
than require) anti-abortion legislation 77. The effective protectlOn 
no incluyen solamente derechos subjetivos de defensa de los individuos frente al 
Estado, y garantías institucionales, sino también deberes positivos por parte de 
éste (vide al respecto arts. 9.2, 17.4, 18.1 Y 4, 20.3 Y 27 de la Constitución). 
Pero, además, los derechos fundamentales son los componentes estructurales 
básicos, tanto del conjunto del orden jurídico objetivo como de cada una de las 
ramas que lo integran, en razón de que son la expresión jurídica de un sistema 
de valoré s que, por decisión del constituyente, ha de informar el conjunto de la 
organización jurídica y política; son, en fin, como dice el artículo 10 de la 
Constitución, el fundamento del orden jurídico y de la paz social. De la signifi-
cación y finalidades de estos derechos dentro del orden constitucional se des-
prende que la garantía de su vigencia no puede limitarse a la posibilidad del 
ejercicio de pretensiones por parte de los individuos, sino que ha de ser asu-
mida también por el Estado. Por consiguiente, de la obligación del someti-
miento de todos los poderes a la Constitución no solamente se deduce la 
obligación negativa del Estado de no lesionar la esfera individual o institucional 
protegida por los derechos fundamentales, sino también de tales derechos, y de 
los valores que representan, aún cuando no exista una pretensión subjetiva por 
parte del ciudadano . Ello obliga especialmente al legislador, quien recibe de los 
derechos fundamentales los impulsos y líneas directivas, obligación que 
adquiere especial relevancia allí donde un derecho o valor fundamental quedaría 
vacío de no establecerse los supuestos para su defensa. 
Despite the tenor of the Spanish opinion, and of this commentary, it should 
be noted that this new social vision is not universally shared in Europe. For 
example, the Austrian abortion decision rejects any duty of affirmative state 
protection of the unborn, reasoning that: 
«the catalogue of fundamental rights of the National Basic Law of 21 
December 1867, on the general rights of citizens, which according to Article 
149 of the Constitution, has the force of a constitutional law, is imbued -as is 
understandable from its period of production- with the classical liberal idea of 
guaranteeing the individual protection against act of force by the state ... 
Nr. 7400-Erk. v. 11 Oktober 1974, G 8/74, 221, 224-25. Translation by 
Cappelletti and Cohen, supra note 38, at 617. 
77. The Austrian decision, id., continues: 
[A) right to life could, according to the provisions contained in the National 
Basic Law for protecting the rights it incorporates, only have the etTect of pro-
tecting the individual against attacks on his life by the state ... If, however, the 
«constitutional law not based on international treaties» does not contain a right 
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this constitutional value had to become an affirmative duty of 
the State, and criminal sanctions had to be seen as an empiri-
cal fact to be relatively effective, in order for the constitutional 
challenge to the Spanish government's partial depenalization of 
abortion to succeed. 
The anti-abortion briefs in this case did not neglect to pro-
mote the Social State doctrine almost as prominently as the 
value of unborn life 78. Somewhat amusingly, the briefs of the 
socialist government argued instead for the c1assical individua-
list idea of constitutional rights, in which such rights are only 
limits to state action and do not require coercive penal acts of 
the State 79. 
Despite the latter «socialist» arguments, the Court affirmed 
a strong Social State doctrine in the abortion case and applied 
it to the fundamental constitutional value «embodied» in unborn 
life (L. F. 5), concluding: 
«ün the basis of the considerations brought forward in Legal 
Foundation 4, [the 1 protection which the Constitution confers 
on the one to be born implies for the State two obligations of 
general character: that of abstaining from interrupting or obs-
tructing the natural process of gestation and that of establishing 
a legal system for the defense of life which involves an effec-
tive protection of the same and that, given the fundamental 
character of life, inc1udes also, as an ultimate guarantee, penal 
norms». (L. F. 7)80. 
to Iife giving protection against other than state interference, then it is unneces-
sary to go into the arguments of the Salzburg proviJ;lcial government as to 
whether such a right also applies to the unborn. For ir the right does not exist, 
the question who is entitled to it does not arise. 
78. Brief of 2 December 1983, at 9, 16-18. Violation of article 1.1, the 
Social State provision, is the second ground of unconstitutionality brought forward 
by petitioners, just after their discussion of article 15, the right to Iife provi-
sion. At page 17 they wisely appeal to the authority of the works of García 
Pelayo (now president of the Court) on the nature of the Social State . Cf., e. 
g., his Las transformaciones del Estado contemporáneo (Madrid: Alianza, 
1977). 
79. BJC. supra note 5, at 526. The government brief appeals ínter alía to 
the clear rejection of the social idea of rights by the Austrian constitutional 
court, supra notes 76 and 77, and to the allegedly implicit rejection by the U. 
S. Supreme Court and fue Italian Constitutional Court, at least with regard to 
any supposed positive duty to punish. (But cf., in regard to Italy, note 38 
supra). The German decision is strongly criticized. 
80. The Spanish here, as found in BJC. íd. at 533, reads as follows: 
Partiendo de las consideraciones efectuadas en el FJ-4, esta protección que 
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Notice the finesse required by the constitutional value of 
life. While abortions for certain reasons may be permitted, 
under the curiously individualist rationale discussed below, 
other abortions must be criminally punished. But ex post Jacto 
punishment is not enough, as discussed aboye in the «Chrono-
logy and Summary of the Decision». In order to give adequate 
protection to unborn life, the penal laws must also require ex 
ante that a specialist physician certify that a particular reason 
exists before the abortion may take place. 
The dissents in Spain, as one would expect, object to the 
Court acting as a legislature. But none argues clear1y that it is 
the Court's expansive concept of the Social State which is at 
fault. Most object to the Court announcing in advance the kind 
of statutory protections it wants, rather than waiting to strike or 
uphold whatever may be the legislative response to a finding of 
unconstitutionality. They also reject the alleged constitutional 
requirement to use penal sanctions here and to perfect the pro-
tection given the fetus. The Court's attempt to discover and 
apply binding principIes or abstract values latent in constitutio-
nal rules comes in for sorne criticism, but not the use of values 
to spell out affirmative duties of the State rather than only 
defense rights against the State 81. 
The opinions of the German majority and dissent yield a 
fuller understanding of the interaction of the value of prenatal 
life and the ideas under1ying the Social State. The Court there 
not only orders the government to punish elective abortion, in 
order to fulfill its affirmative duty effectively to protect the one 
to be born, but also requires that the State teach life's value in 
la Constitución dispensa al nasciturus implica para el Estado con carácter 
general dos obligaciones: la de abstenerse de interrumpir o de obstaculizar el 
proceso natural de gestación, y la de establecer un sistema legal para la 
defensa de la vida que suponga una protección efectiva de la misma y que, 
dado el carácter fundamental de la vida , incluya también, como última garantía, 
las normas penales . 
81. Francisco Rubio Llorente, in dissent, comes closest to objecting to a 
Social State based on values when he argues that «the interpreter of the Cons-
titution cannot abstract from [its) precepts the value or values which... such 
precepts 'embody', in order to deduce from them ... obligations of the legislator 
which are unsupported in any concrete constitutional text... The values that ins-
pire a precept may serve ... [only) for the interpretation of that precept...» EJe, 
supra note 5, at 541. 
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legislation and in individual counseling 82. This pervasive em-
phasis on the pedagogical function of law is the most strikingly 
communitarian aspect of the German decision, while it is stran-
gely absent from the Spanish. Surely public education is the 
ultimate difference between a communitarian law based on 
values and an individualist law based on rules. No matter how 
many constitutional or legislative rules are derived from public 
values, a community of shared values does not arise except to 
tbe extent tbat individuals come to aim at tbose values tbemselves 
rather than only at rule compliance. Otherwise even the most 
elaborate labyrinth of rules is only a complicated game played 
for the sake of the furtherance of private interests. 
The German dissent well recognizes the difficulties inherent 
in court enforcement of constitutional values: 
As defense rights the fundamental rights have a comparatively 
clear recognizable content; in their interpretation and applica-
tion, the judicial opinions have developed practicable, the judi-
cial opinions have developed practicable, gene rally recognized 
criteria for the control of state encroachments - for example, 
the principIe of proportionality. On the other hand, it is regu-
lady a most complex question, how a value decision is to be 
realized through affirmative measures of the legislature. The 
necessarily gene rally held value decisions can be perhaps cha-
racterized as constitutional mandates which, to be sure, are 
assigned to point the direction for all state dealings but are 
directed necessarily toward a transposition of binding regula-
tions. Based upon the determination of the actual circumstan-
ces, of the concrete setting of goals and their priority and of 
the suitability of conceivable means and ways, very different 
solutions are possible. The decision, which frequently presup-
poses compromises and takes place in the course of trial and 
error, belongs, according to the principIe of division of powers 
and to the democratic principIe, to the responsibility of the 
legislature directly legitimatized by the people 83. 
The dissent's solutions seems, however, largely to restate 
rather than to soIve the problems it has raised. It urges the 
Court to «confront the Iegislature only when the Iatter has com-
82. See citations supra note 49. Contrast Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. 2169 at 
2178-81, 90 L. Ed. 2d 779 at 793-96, where counseling discouraging abortion 
is forbidden to the State. 
83. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 71-72; Jonas and Gorby, supra note 3 at 665-
66. 
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pletely disregarded a value decision or when the nature and 
manner of its realization is obviously faulty» 84. 
This last language reminds one a bit of the U. S. Supreme 
Court's «rational basis» and «state interest» tests. But note this 
important difference: Except for a very limited number of 
impermissible goals (such as the promotion of racism), U. S. 
legislation may aim at any state interest. Or, where equal pro-
tection of fundamental rights are involved, it may aim at any 
«compelling» state interest. There is not,except very broadly 
and by negative implication, an order of constitutional values 
which government must affirmatively promote. Indeed, our states 
may sometimes aim at values opposite to those underlying the 
Constitution as interpreted by the Court. 
A glance at the U. S. abortion decisions of the last ten 
years will make clear the contrast between American and Euro-
pean doctrine here. The original Roe decision proclaimed the 
value of private choice with regard to abortion, and saw in that 
value a prohibition on state action interfering with abortion. Yet 
the government is under no obligation to use its funds 85 or its 
hospitals 86 neutrally to promote choice. Instead, it may favor 
childbirth over abortion, even where its motives are the very 
value philosophies condemned by Roe as a basis for penalizing 
abortion 87. In later extrapolating upon this conclusion, the U. 
S. Court specifically appealed to the classic constitutionalism of 
defense rights only rather than the new communitarian emphasis 
on rights to affirmative state support 88. In that later case, the 
Court ruled that even health abortions need not be funded by 
the state, despite the fact that in Roe maternal health broadly 
construed had be en held to be constitutionally more important 
than fetal even after viability 89. The value decisions of our 
Constitution do not in themselves bind legislatures, and a for-
tiori need not be taught to citizens. 
AlI this is not to say that there would be no possible way 
way for an anti-abortion United States Supreme Court to 
84. (1975) 39 BVerfGE 1, 73; Jonas and Gorby, id. at 666. 
85. Maher v. Roe 432 U. S. 464, 474 (1977). 
86. Poelker v. Doe 432 U. S. 519, 521 (1977). 
87. Id. 
88. Harris v. McRae 448 U. S. 297, 317-318 (1980). 
89. Id., at 316, 325-326. 
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require criminal laws against abortion. The Court could try to 
find sorne state action (e. g. financial) involved in depenaljzed 
private abortions, in order to forbid them. Or it could find state 
action in the enforcement of contracts related to abortion or of 
laws preventing sit-ins at abortion clinics, which would de Jacto 
make abortion unavailable. Or it could argue that · equal protec-
tion, even if it were attenuated prior to birth, mandates sorne 
measure of protection for the unborn as long as the killing of 
neonates remains illegal. (Or it could go the other way and 
insist that infanticide be unpunished as long as abortion is 
unpunished). But it could not, without a deep ideological shift, 
appeal to the social duty of the government to promote the 
constitutional value of respect for life. 
5. Critique oJ the Court and the Social State 
Though 1 am sympathetic both to socialism and to the pro-
tection of unborn life, 1 cannot agree with the approach taken 
by the Spanish and German high courts. 
My problem is not with the idea of an order of principIes 
implicit in legal rules and usable in deriving new rules. Such 
analogical reasoning, however indeterminate it may be, seems 
to me a necessary part of the honest ant thoughtful evolution of 
public order. It accounts for the greatest achievements both of 
Anglo-American common law and of European legal science. 
Nor do 1 object to the affirmative quality of these values. 1 
think life together is much more meaningful if we hold sorne, 
though not aB, aims in common. 1 would like to think that there 
are common goods, such as life, which many of our laws pur-
sue and which are and ought to be taught to us aB. 
My problem is with the institution of judicial review. Even 
here 1 am less concerned where only defense rights are involved. 
As long as a high court can play only a negative role, it must 
at least work very had to achieve institutional dominance. But 
when judicial review is combined with the vague values and 
affirmative duties of the Social State, then the power of judges 
may be overextended. 
The rule of law (Estado de Derecho) itself may not survive, 
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as the Spanish government argued in its brief90. The whole pro-
blem, in my view, lies in the word «effective» invoked both in 
Spain and in Germany. In order for values to be «effectively» 
promoted, empirical results rather than only rules must be scru-
tinized. Rules at the constitutional and at the legislative levels 
have to be changed whenever necessary in order to achieve 
results, even ex post jacto in particular cases. That is how 
common barn builders would handle the rules for hammer use. 
It may even be unconstitutional not to change the rules whenever 
they produce results contrary to basic values 91 • 
While I wish, with sorne trepidation, to affirm such ruleless 
community (or, better, communities) as an ideal to be pursued, 
I am deeply concerned about placing virtually unlimited power 
over the development and content of such community in the 
potentially arbitrary discretion of any very small number of 
persons. 
Judicial review and the Social State should not be combined. 
Perhaps judicial review should not exist even for defense rights. 
Such review implies a hostility between the legislating com-
munity ,and the individual which ideally should be overcome 
by education and by more participatory forms of democracy, 
rather than accommodated. But in any event judicial review 
should not extend to the positive and programmatic social 
duties stated or implied in a constitution. Those principIes 
should be the starting points for public reasoning by all citi-
zens, not the privileged prerogative of a tiny group of 
jurists 92. 
90. BJe, supra note 5, at 527-528. 
91. Rule utilitarianism has no adequate response here, for it contains an 
antinomy. Even if we need rigid rules in order to preserve our values, why 
should those rules be followed when they seem certain to produce disvalue? A 
legal system wholly concerned about consequences could not avoid constantly 
rethinking its rules . It might avoid anarchy by disabling individual citizens or 
judges from ignoring rules, but it would have to make centralized review availa-
ble in every case where one could plausibly argue that a revised rule would 
more efficiently promote the values at stake . For an excellent review of the 
proposed solutions to this general moral and legal quandary, see Lawrence Ale-
xander, «Pursuing the Good - Indirectly», 95 Ethics 315 (January, 1985). 
92. 1 do not think one should belittle a judicially unenforced constitutional 
social duty or right as «merely a platform plank elevated to constitutional sta-
tus». Cfr. the discussion of «programmatic» rather than «enforceable» constitu-
tional provisions in Italy in Mauro Cappelletti, John Henry Merryman, and 
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6. The Doctrine 01 «Too Much to Demand 
Life is a «superior», «fundamental», and «central» constitu-
tional value in Spain, and the fetus «embodies» this value. The 
government has an affirmative duty to protect unborn life by 
means of criminal penalties for its destruction. Yet the high 
court there goes on to permit abortion in aH the circumstances 
listed in the bill under review: grave danger to maternal life or 
health, rape, and likelihood of severe disability in the child. 
How does the Court make such a turnaround? 
One might have expected the Court, in line with its commu-
nitarian perspectiveelsewhere, to look to the common good and 
to argue that the protection of unborn life is not, or does not 
always result in, the highest constitutional value. But in nowhere 
asserts that other values are more important than fetal life. It 
mentions two theories by which the bill in question may be jus-
tified: legislative choice between conflicting values and the doc-
trine of non-demandability (L. F. 10). The latter, however, is 
the only c1ear referent in most of the situations considered. The 
Court appeals primarily to the idea that a continuation of preg-
nancy in such circumstances is just too much for the criminal 
law to demand of an individual. Even if such abortions do more 
harm than good to the values of the community, the State need 
not punish them because there is a limit to what individual s 
must sacrifice for constitutional values. 
The doctrine of non-demandability in Spain has its origin in 
German legal thought, where it was originaHy conceived as an 
extrastatutory defense to crime from an individualist perspec-
Joseph Perillo, The ¡tafian Legal System 58 (Stanford University Press, 1967). 
Prom the deliberations of juries to those of supreme courts we often rely upon 
nonenforceable good faith imp1ementation of legally binding principies. 1 do not 
see why elected representatives shou1d enjoy less confidence. 
The Spanish constitution itself distinguishes between «rights» ane! «duties» 
(articles 14-38) and «guiding principies of social and economic politics» (arti-
eles 39-52), making the former «binding» (articles 53.1 and 53.2) and the latter 
only «informing» (article 53.3). Perhaps values (such as <dife») latent in 
these rights and duties should be considered mere «guiding principies», 
though my own view is more that they should be considered binding in cons-
cience upon the legislature but not enforceable by courts (at least not 
against sta tutes ). 
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tive 93. It is felt in the Spanish Penal Code in various ways, par-
ticularly in Article 8, to which the Court specifically refers in 
its opinion 94. That article permits the defense of necessity when 
an otherwise illegal act is done in order to avoid a greater or 
an equal harm. The doctrine of nondemandability is thought by 
the dominant opinion in Spain to account for the latter situa-
tion 95: It is just too much to demand of a person that he or she 
sacrifice a personal interest simply for the sake of someone 
else's merely equal interest. A concrete example of the 
influence of this doctrine is found in Article 18 of the Penal 
Code, which exempts close family members from punishment 
for harboring a fugitive. Again, one might say that the penal 
law just cannot demand that a fugitive's spouse or parent refuse to 
take him or her in, despite the general prohibition of such an act 96. 
93. One of the earliest uses of this concept in criminal law occurred in the 
famous 1897 Leinenfanger decision of the Reichsgericht . There the Court went 
beyond the penal code to reason that although the omission in question «consi-
dering the common good ... could be demanded of the agent», one must al so ask 
whether it could be demanded of the accused under the circumstances. 30 Ents 
cheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen, 25-28, as quoted in Jiménez de 
Asúa, supra note 23, at 935. Early reaction attacked this doctrine for its «indi-
vidualist philosophy». Rodríguez Devesa, supra note 25, Derecho Penal Espa-
ñol, Parte General, 611 (Madrid: 1979). 
94. Article 8 of the Spanish Penal Code exempts various persons from cri-
minal responsibility, including the insane and infants. Section 4 adds an exemp-
tion for «one who acts in defense of a person or rights, his own or alien 
('propios o ajenos')) as long as there has been illegitimate aggression, rational 
choice of means, and lack of provocation. The key section 7 exempts «one 
who, impelled by a state of necessity, in order to avoid an evil of his own or 
one alien to him ('mal propio o ajeno '), injures a legal good ('bien jurídico ') of 
another person ... ,» provided that the evil caused is not greater than that which 
he seeks to avoid, that he has not intentionally provoked the situation of neces-
sity, and that he does not have a special obligation to sacrifice himself. Section 9 
covers those who act under «irresistible force» and section 10 those who act out 
of insuperable fear «of an equal or greater evil». Article 8 thus incorporates ideas 
both of «excuse» (what might be called «necessity in the order of events») and of 
<<justification» (what might be called «necessity in the order of ideas»). 
Luis Jiménez de Asúa, 7 Tratado de Derecho Penal, second edition, 196 
(Buenos Aires: Losada, 1962, 1977) considers fear and necessity under conflict 
of equal goods to be excuses originating in the non-demandability idea. He 
adds other examples from the Spanish Penal Code, including the harboring of a 
fugitive by near relations (art. 18) and the omission of non-demandable aid 
(art. 489). Sorne Spanish opinion al so supports non-demandability as a judicial 
excuse existing outside the Penal Code, e. g. Ricardo de Angel Yáguez et al., 
Ley del aborto 100-01 (Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto, 1985). 
95. Rodríguez Devesa, supra note 93, at 556, 609-19. 
96. The rationale for this defense is disputed, but the dominant opinion 
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As will become evident later, it is very important to unders-
tand whether this doctrine is one of justification or of excuse. 
That is, does the personal burden under which the defendant 
labors serve to make an otherwise wrong act right, or does it 
only mean that the defendant is not to be blamed (or even 
simply not to be punished) for the still wrongful act? 97 
The dominant theory 98 in Spain appears to treat the non-
today appears to be that non-demandability is its basis . See Jiménez de Asúa, 
supra note 23, at 1014, and Rodríguez Devesa, supra note 93, at 618-19. 
97. Note that the question posed here is one of the normative appeal of the 
non-demandability doctrine, not of the technical legal category used by the 
legislature to effectuate the doctrine. Thus, for example, if we as legislators feel-
an ordinarily criminal act (or omission) to be justified because to avoid it 
would be to incur a non-demandable sacrifice, we may still choose to effectuate 
our conclusion either by promulgating a new justificatory defense of sacrifice 
avoidance or by redefining the original criminal offense to include only non-
sacrificial acts (or omissions). Only the former would be explicitly called a 
«justification» in subsequent legal theory, but the latter solution would have 
responded equally to our normative sense that previously criminalized conduct 
was justified. 
Similarly, a normative sense that someone who commits a wrongful act (or 
omission) in order to avoid a sacrifice is excused could result statutorily either 
in a defense like duress which claims a kind of inability to act otherwise in a 
certain situation, or in a definition of persons in such a situation to be acting 
insanely or involuntarily, or in a kind of ex ante pardon of anyone who com-
mits a crime in such a situation. Or it even could result in a redefinition of the 
original criminal offense to exclude those who act under certain pressures, 
though the latter might be read to put a stamp of approval on conduct which is 
merely excused. But none of these technical solutions would detract from our 
original normative judgement that intrinsically wrongful conduct should here 
be excused. 
There are, of course, reasons other than justification or excuse for not punish-
ing sorne acts - administrative convenience or diplomatic immunity, for exam-
pIe. But as 1 read the non-demandability doctrine, it has an ethical flavor not 
fully captured by other commonly accepted reasons for non-punishment, nor 
would analysis of those reasons significantly change the conclusions later reached 
in this article. Therefore, subsequent discussion seeks only to decide whether 
non-demandability is more appropriately viewed as a matter of justification or 
as a matter of excuse. 
For the many technical categories and rationales for exemption from punish-
ment available in Spanish and German law, see e. g. Jiménez de Asúa, supra 
note 94 at 193-97, and Walter Gropp, Der straj70se Schwangerschaftsahhruch 
138-39, 192 (Tuebingen: J. C . B. Mohr, 1981). 
98. Both Jiménez de Asúa, supra note 23 at 932ff, and Rodríguez Devesa, 
supra note 93 at 609ff, treat non-demandability under the more general cate-
gory of exculpation or non-blameworthiness, i. e. as a kind of excuse rather 
than of justification, and assert this to be the dominant view. Nevertheless, the 
former mentions sorne penalists who consider non-demandability to be a justifi-
cation, at 967-69, and the latter seems to use the non-demandability notion as 
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demandability doctrine as one of excuse. Under such an 
approach, no one is justified in preferring his or her own 
values, or own spouse, to the values established by the commu-
nity, but nevertheless such antisocial acts are not punished 
where the subject in sorne sense could not act otherwise. An 
act which is wrongful but nonpreventable, or at least not pre-
ventable by means of the criminal law, is not to be punished. 
Note that if a mere excuse for an act is involved, legitimate 
defense against the act remains possible 99, and there are a num-
ber of other significant legal consequences to be explored 
latero 
On the other hand, there are sorne Spanish doctrinal con si-
derations which point to calling the non-demandability idea a 
justification lOO. And it can be argued that where no one, or no 
one except a hero, is in sorne sense able to comply with a cer-
tain legal command, then acts or omissions in violation of that 
norm lose their wrongful character even though they do not 
avoid more harm than they cause. Furthermore, there are places 
in Spanish law where a theory of non-demandability seems to 
have resulted in a full statutory justification, in the sense of a 
legal certification of the non-wrongfulness of the conduct in 
question. The penal law requirements to stop crime (Art. 338 
bis), to rescue (Art. 489 bis), and to give assistance (Art. 586 
(2» apply only where they can be observed without risk to the 
actor or to a third party 101. Note that the omission of risky acts 
is here justified, at least in the special sense that it is excluded 
a general concept containing aH justifications and exculpations, as weH as a 
specific concept involving non-blameworthiness, at '609-11, 
99. Rodríguez Devesa, supra note 93, at 557. Jiménez de Asúa, supra note 
94, at 201-202. 
100. See the discussion supra note 98. Note that the mere fact that an 
objective balancing of values may be involved is not necessarily a consideration 
leading us to classify non-demandability as justification. As George Fletcher 
has pointed out, Rethingking Criminal Law 804 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), 
we expect people to be able to make greater sacrifices when more is at stake, 
We may excuse someone who breaks another's leg under the threat of losing 
his own, but not someone who blows up a city under the same threat. 
101. Rodríguez Devesa, supra note 93 at 611, lists these code provisions 
as examples of the impact of nondemandability upon the definition of offenses 
(<<tipos»). Similarly, Jiménez de Asúa classifies rescue in the face of personal 
risk as an example of what the law considers nondemandable. Supra note 23 at 
1019-20. 
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from the definition (tipo) of these crimes 102, although Artic1e 8 
would not even excuse it - for the actor is refusing to risk a 
slight personal interest at the cost of greater harm to others 103. 
This contradiction can perhaps be overcome if we cannot 
demand and expect public spirited actions to the degree to 
which we exact public spirited omissions. 
Legislators supporting the enactment of the new abortion 
statute appealed frequentIy to the non-demandability notion 
-often as an excuse 104. Likewise the government brief in the 
constitutional case is written as though the issue of nondeman-
dability is one of whether or not a woman having an abortion 
102. I am here treating non-definition as equivalent to justification. Cf. 
supra note 97. This equivalence need not always obtain. For example, a revo-
lutionary government may simply not have gotten around to defining all the 
conduct of which it disapproves, so that non-definition of a particular act as 
criminal implies no judgment that the act is legally acceptable. But where, as in 
these rescue provisions, the legislature has clearly considered the precise limits 
of liability it wishes to impose, and has exempted certain conduct (rather than 
persons), then 1 do not perceive either an intended or an objective substantive 
difference between the technique of non-definition and that of justification by 
means of a special defense - though there may be important procedural, bur-
den of proof, and mistake-related differences in a particular legal system. If 
anything, the legislativedecision to exc1ude a certain act from the definition of 
a crime would seem to give that act more official approval than if it had remained 
prima jacie criminal but justified. Therefore, conscious non-definition would fall 
ordinarily on the justification side of our bipolar justification vs. excuse ques-
tion. Cf. Fletcher, supra note 100, at 552-79. But note that Jiménez de Asúa, 
supra note 23 at 1019-20 and note 93 at 196, writes as though the non-
definition of failure to rescue (in the face of risk) as a crime were based on the 
notion that such a refusal of aid is excused, with the nearly explicit conse-
quence that all omissions of rescue remain somehow objectively unlawful. Id. 
at 201. If he is correct, then the case for considering non-punished abortion 
likewise to be merely excused becomes even stronger. See this article injra pp. 
49-45. 
103. Article 8 excuses an otherwise illegal act only if the benefit of such 
an act is equal to its cost. Supra note 94. 
104. The socialist Minister of Justice, Ledesma Bartret, argued on 25 
February 1983 that the nondemandability of continued pregnancy in certain cir-
cumstances is a cause of excuse (<<inculpabilidad») for abortion. Supra note 6 
at 17. On 25 May that year, Saenz Coscullela, speaking «in the na me of the 
Socialist Group», argued that the abortion bill does not «legalize». Indeed, it 
expresses a «generic disapprobation» of abortion, while establishing an 
«excuse» (<<excusa») for therapeutic abortion, and refuses to blame (<<incul-
par») abortions occurring where further pregnancy is not demandable. Diario 
de sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, 11 Legislatura, Num. 40, at 1850. 
Again on 4 October 1983, the PSOE member Sotillo Martí argued, in favor' of 
nonpunishment of sorne abortions, that where other conduct is not demandable, 
an act lacks blameworthiness, i. e. is excused. Id" Num. 61 at 2888. 
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should be sirnply exculpated (i. e. excused) in the specified 
situations 105. The only dissents which rnention the rnatter in 
sorne detail link the idea of non-dernandability to that of 
legal excuse 106. 
In sorne of the above argurnents, however, there is an 
undercurrent of justificatory reasoning 107. And on at least one 
occasion, spokespersons, for the proposed legislation clearly 
insisted that the abortions at issue were to be treated as lawful, 
not sirnply unblarneworthy 108. 
The " Constitutional Court's own opinion, unfortunately, is 
far frorn clear. Neither in its general discussion of non-
dernandability (L. F. 9) nor in its specific applications of that 
idea (L. F. 11) does the Court label the notion «excuse» or 
<<justification». The opinion does not, however, explicitIy treat 
any abortion as justified in the sense that it is the best solution, 
the one, which rnaxirnizes net resuItant value. Except in the 
Court's treatment of abortion to save the rnother's life and perhaps 
to avoid grave danger to her health (where it rnay possibly be 
treating the child as an aggressor against whorn the rnother has 
a right of self-defense (L. F. 11 (a», the Court looks overtIy to 
the idea (and only to the idea) that sorne pregnancy continua-
tions are too rnuch to dernand of a wornan. In considering rape 
pregnancies, the Court lists the constitutionalIy recognized 
105. BJe, supra note 5, at 529-30. 
106. Francisco Tomás y Valiente insists that the abortion bill contains neit-
her a legalization nor a depenalization of abortion, but simply a declaration of 
nonpunishment in certain situations, while maintaining intact the definition of 
the crime (<<manteniendo intacto el tipo delictivo»). A judge, not a physician, 
thus should decide when those situational requirements have been met, since 
the acts regulated by arto 417 continue being criminal (<<continuan siendo delic-
tivas»). He adds, however, that the basic rule prohibiting abortion appears to 
him of doubtful constitutionality. Id. at 539. See al so the less clear linkage of 
nonculpability and excuse in the opinion of Jerónimo Arozamena Sierra. 
Id. at 537. 
107. Arozamena Sierra, id . Also Sotillo Martí supra note 104, and the 
government brief supra note 105. 
108. So argued bill supporters López Riaño and Sotillo Martí on 7 Septem-
ber 1983, claiming that because of the nondemandability of other conduct, the 
abortions specified in the bill would no longer be simply not blameworthy. 
They would be not unlawful and would not any more be included in the defini-
tion (<<tipo») of the crime of abortion. Supra note 35 at 2121 and 2140-41. 
But cf. the latter's other arguments discussed in the same note and in note 
104. 
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values of the woman which have be en harmed by that act of 
violence. But it does not suggest that denying her an abortion 
would have a further overall negative effect on the values at 
stake. Instead, it reasons that obligating her to put up with 
the consequences of rape is not demandable (L. F. 11 (b». In 
the case of abortion for probable grave disabilities in the child, 
the Court is even more straightforward. The basis for non-
punishment of such abortions, according to the Court, is that to 
require continuation of pregnancy would be an imposition on 
the mother beyond that which is normally demandable. That 
parents put up with the inevitable insecurity attending such a 
pregnancy is too much to demando It is hard even to imagine 
that avoiding such parental anxiety is constitutionally a funda-
mental value equal to life in Spanish law, so that the Court 
could in any event appeal only to non-demandability in order to 
uphold this portion of the law in question (L. F. 11 (c» 109. 
Once again, the often unspoken background for all these 
Spanish arguments is German legal theory. It was in Germany 
that the idea of non-demandability first arose doctrinally 110. It 
is there used to explain code-based «excusing necessity», which 
is structured differentIy from the necessity defense in Spain 11. 
The German abortion depenalization statute itself permitted 
109. Despite the Constitutio's explicit directive, found in article 49, that 
the State protect the disabled, the Court does not discuss the possible repercus-
sions which the lega!ization of such abortions may have on future public and 
parental attitudes and actions with regard to those bom with severe handicaps 
- but then this point is likewise ignored in the briefs. For research indicating a 
negative impact, see John Fletcher, «Attitudes Toward Defective Newboms», 2 
(1) Hastings Center Studies 21 (January 1974). 
Nor does the Court anywhere suggest the now commonplace notion that !ife 
with severe disabilities may have relatively little value or even be a disvalue. 
Such a suggestion would obviously go a long way toward tipping the scales in 
favor of parental interests. 
110. For a discussion of the nature and context of the German (and, indi-
rectly, the Spanish) concept of «Unzumutbarkeit», see Fletcher, supra note 
100 at 833ff, and Albin Eser, «Justification and Excuse», 24 Amer. J. Comp. 
L. 624 (1976). See also Jimenez de Asúa, supra note 23 at 930ff. 
111. The German Penal Code separates necessity (Notstand) into two arti-
eles, 34 and 35, and titles the first «Justifying Necessity» and the second 
«Excusing Necessity». According to the latter, certain persons are excused 
when they must act illegally to avoid a danger to life, limb, or liberty, unless 
they could have been expected (demanded, «zugemutet») to accept the risk 
(<<Gefahr») involved. See e. g. Eduard Dreher and Herbert Trondle, Strafge-
setzbuch 42d ed., 188, 196 (Munchen: Beck, 1985). 
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post-twelve-week-gestation abortion where there was a danger 
to maternal tife or health or of serious fetal defect such that no 
alternative to abortion could be demanded (<<zumutbare» and 
«verlangt» respectively) 112. 
Not surprisingly, the West German Constitutional Court 
tikewise uses the nondemandability doctrine to deal with abor-
tion. The Court indeed appears to base its approval of 
hardship-case abortions exclusively upon this idea -even where 
continued pregnancy would threaten a woman's own tife or 
health 113. It appties the doctrine without further argument to the 
case of potentially grave disability abortions (which the Court 
calls «eugenic» abortions) 114 and to «social» abortions involving 
equivalent hardship because of the woman's tife context. Unfor-
tunately, theCourt sends mixed signals on the issue of whether 
non-demandability makes all these abortions justified or merely 
excused 115. 
Spanish commentary upon the German constitutional settle-
ment, prior to Spain's own proposed law reform, was gene rally 
critical. Commentators both opposing 116 and favoring 117 exten-
sive abortion rights had difficulty understanding how non-
demandability could permit abortion in e face of the German 
high court's strong affirmation of the duty of the State to pro-
tect unborn tife. At most, it was argued, the Court's reasoning 
112. The actual statute was somewhat more complex than this summary. 
See [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 4-6, and Jonas and Gorby, supra note 3 at 
611-12. 
113. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 48-50; Jonas and Gorby, id. at 647-48. 
114. Id., indicating approval of earlier govemmental arguments in favor of 
non-punishment of disability- and rape-based abortions. 
115. For example, the Court indicates that even where abortion is not 
punished, the State is expected to remind a woman of her «fundamental duty 
('Pflicht') to respect the right to Jife of the unbom, to encourage her to conti-
nue the pregnancy». Id. Yet the Court later insists that the law distinguish the 
justified «<gerechtfertigten») cases of abortion from the reprehensible (<<verwer-
flichen») ones. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 58; Jonas and Gorby, id. at 654-55. 
Sorting out these remarks in light of the basic principIes goveming the decision, 
the Dreher and Trondle commentary concludes that the Constitutional Court's 
decision points in the direction of an excuse understanding. Supra note 111, 
prenote 9 to § 218, at 999-1000. 
116. Rodríguez Devesa, supra note 25, at 99. Prof. Rodríguez Devesa lat-
ter joined in the book En Defensa de la vida, supra note 37, opposing the 
abortion depenalization bill. 
117. Arroyo Zapatero, supra note 36 at 205. 
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would lead to excusing such abortions, not to justifying 
them. 
United States' criminal law does not contain an explicit 
defense of non-demandability. Our «duress» or «coercion» 
defense, which is generally considered an excuse, is perhaps its 
c10sest analogue, but that defense is more limited than the Spanish 
Article 8 or the German «exc1using necessity» 118. It could not 
apply to abortion because no one is threatening harm to the 
mother unless she ends her pregnancy. There exists for us no 
comprehensive penal or constitutional principIe which ensures 
that no one is punished for doing an act whenever not doing the 
act is «too much to demand». 
Despite our restricted theory of excuses, however, it could 
be argued that something like non-demandability pervades our 
law, and does so often in the form of justification. After all, 
except in Vermont, we do not require rescues of strangers in 
the first place, not even where they involve no risk whatsoever. 
It has been suggested that it is too restrictive to impose on 
everyone that they be good samaritans 119. Again, we sometimes 
permit a violent response to aggression, even where retreat is 
possible, and especially where retreat would involve sorne 
risk 120. Are we perhaps saying that it is too much to ask of vic-
tims that they act against their own interests in order to protect 
the interests of aggressors, even when the net harm caused by 
resistance is much greater than that caused by retreat? 
Roe v. Wade obviously did not need to draw upon anything 
like the aboye lines of reasoning; its denial of constitutional 
value in the unborn child meant that it did not have to search 
for a justification or excuse for abortion beyond the right of pri-
vacy. But there have be en a number of scholars who have 
sought to justify the result in Roe, elective abortion, by appeal'-
ing to our alleged tradition of «bad samaritanism» 121. The 
118. Supra note 111. The German penal article 35 is limited to excusing 
those who protect themselves or those near to them. But there remains sorne 
support for nondemandability as an extrastatutory defense. 
119. Calabresi, supra note 70 at 102-03, reports and disagrees with 
this sentiment. 
120. See e. g. the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code § 3.04 (2) 
(b) (ii). 
121. See e. g. Donald H . Regan, «Rewriting Roe v. Wade» 77 Mich. L. 
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explicit thrust of these arguments is that even if it were se en to 
be a person possessing a constitutional right to life, elective 
abortion would be permissible because our law does not gene-
rally require individuals to aid others at substantial cost to 
themselves. Though I have not found these thoughts to coalesce 
around precisely the non-demandability doctrine of Europe, 
surely something similar is at work here. If elsewhere we are 
individualists believing in laissez faire and laissez mourir, it 
must seem to many of us «too much to demand» of a pregnant 
woman that she alone make great sacrifices - a point to which 
I return at the end of this commentary. 
7. Critique of the «Too Much to Demand» Doctrine 
There are three final points I would like to make at sorne 
length. The first is that the cDncept of non-demandability, even 
if accepted as a starting point for legal reasoning, is incapable 
of doirig what its adherents want it to do, namely of giving at 
least sorne abortions the fuIl support of the law. The second is 
that non-demandability is in fact unacceptable as a first princi-
pIe of reason, for it obscures as much as it reveals. The third is 
that, despite its deficiencies, the doctrine remains extremely 
useful to show that the abortion dilemma is merely one mani-
festation of the tension between community and individual and 
that a solution to the dilemma depends, therefore, on a relaxa-
tion of the tension. 
As we have seen, there are two ways to understand Spanish 
(and German) constitutional law on abo~tion - that the legisla-
ture may treat sorne abortions as excused or that it may treat 
them as justified. My argument is that under both hypotheses a 
tension results in the law, but only in the latter case does it 
approach a contradiction. 
The first hypothesis -excuse- seems to me the most plau-
sible interpretation of the Spanish court's opinion. The doctrine 
of non-demandability is ordinarily treated in Spain 122 and in 
Rev. 1569 (1979) and Judith Jarvis Thompson, «A Defense of Abortion» , 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 47 (1971) . 
122. Supra note 98. 
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Germany 123 as one involving excuse. Given both courts' refusal 
to affirm that the unborn child has substantialIy less legal value 
than the mother, it is hard to see how any abortion (except, 
perhaps, for the mother's life) could be justified without at least 
a great deal of argumentation, which is left unsupplied 124. 
Moreover, the Spanish law in question bears a stronger resem-
blance to Penal Code Article 18 (excusing family members who 
harbor a fugitive) than it does to Article 489 bis (declaring a 
duty to rescue only where there is no risk to oneself). Like the 
former and unlike the latter, the abortion depenalization law 
does not expressly alter the definition (type) of the crime but 
only precludes the imposition of punishment in certain cases. 
This difference, 1 think, should be understood to be one of 
excuse vs. justification, as has be en argued 125. 
As excuse, non-demandability can be given a fairIy precise 
meaning. Penalties are set according to what is ordinarily 
necessary for deterrence and must not be excessive in propor-
tion to ultimate culpability. But then persons having to make 
unusualIy high sacrifices in order to comply with the law cannot 
be compelled to do so. Such persons are arguably both less 
culpable (because the net harm caused by the escused offense 
is less than that caused by an ordinary offense where no harm 
is at the same time avoided) and less deterrable (because again 
of the unusual personal harm resulting from failure to commit 
the offense). Thus, within the limits set by proportionality [See 
L. F. 10], there may be no penalty adequate to deter indivi-
duals from acts necessary to avoid great personal hardship. 
Without an adequate deterrent motive, the «ideal type» rational 
self-interested individual may be lite rally unable to comply with 
the law. And where the threat of punishment can serve no pur-
pose, it should not even be made. Acts involving great and unu-
su al hardship cannot be exacted 126 by ex post Jacto penalties 
123. Albin Eser, supra note 110 at 627, 637. This essay is also a use fuI 
introduction to the basic structure of German (and of much of Spanish) 
penal theory. 
124. See generally the Dreher and Trondle discussion cited supra note 
115. 
125. But cf. the arguments of Jiménez de Asúa, discussed supra note 
102. 
126. «Exactability» is the word used by Jonas and Gorby, supra note 3, to 
translate «Zumutbarkeit». 1 have ordinarily preferred «demandability» because 
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and should, therefore, be excused by law - even if those acts 
have a net negative effect on public values. 
Excuse fits better than justification into the communitarian 
ethos of the Spanish decision. It is perhaps not logically incon-
sistent, but it certainly would be a shift in ideology for a court 
one moment to emphasize duties to pursue common values and 
the next moment to declare individuals to be legally justified in 
destroying those values. By contrast, there would be nothing 
strange about a fully developed socialist jurisprudence recog-
nizing that human beings are not (or at least not yet) so consti-
tuted as to be able in all circumstances to give the same weight 
toothers' interests as they do to their own. Where this is the 
case, proportionate punishment may serve little purpose. The 
penal law, at least, should excuse such unjustified selfpreference. 
But excuse thinking alone cannot fully legalize abortión, for 
a number of reasons. Excuse is considered to apply only to the 
person s'o burdened that he or she is unable to act rightly 
toward the fetus. It is not thought to apply to third parties. 
Specifically, it would seem not to apply to the doctor performing 
the abortion any more than the excuse of duress applies to by-
standers who help a threatened person carry out some difficult 
crime. The government's strongest argument, non-demandability 
as excuse, in favor of its statute makes little sense, for that sta-
tute clearly exempts from punishment al! parties to certain 
abortions, not just the mother. The difficulty of excusing the 
aborting physician had be en noticed already in 1982, in a quite 
cogent Spanish law journal article 127. If the anti-abortion brief 
had contained more than its one exceedingly short reference to this 
point 128, perhaps the Court would not entirely have overlooked this 
stumbling block in its lengthy summary of the arguments. 
At this time, of course, the non-punishment of the doctor 
has been approved. That is the Court's holding, regardless of 
whether or how that conclusion is supported by its reasoning 
(at least until fuller argument lead~ it to a different conclusion). 
The principie of legality, the principie of non-punishment without a 
of its greater normative resonance in English, but here the more physically 
coercive feeling of the word «exacted» captures the point better. 
127. J. Cerezo Mir, supra note 33. 
128. Petitioners' supplementary brief of 3 January 1983 [se] at 16. 
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prior statutory violation, would seem to preelude any penalty 
for a physician doing an abortion in one of the specified cir-
eumstanees. But this does not entirely dispose of our problem. 
If abortions is only exeused rather than justified under penal 
law, what is its status in civil law? 129 For example, eould a father 
sue for damages beeause his unborn ehild has be en aborted? 
(Or eould he sue a physieian for negligently failing to abort his 
handieapped infant?) Must, or even may, State social insuranee 
programs pay for the legal status of a eontraet to deliver aborti-
facients if abortion remains legally unjustified? 130 
Even more signifieantly, if abortion remains always wrong-
fuI albeit exeused, eould not third parties intervene to stop 
abortion of developmentally disabled fetuses, espeeially if they 
did so in sorne minimally intrusive non-violent way? The neees-
sity defense in the United States has not be en very sueeessful 
in preventing the eonviction of those who sit in at abortion eli-
nies 131, but Spanish law looks very different. Article 8's idea of 
129. The Spanish court opinion, in L. F. 14, explicity avoids resolving the 
civil law issues raised by the non-punishment of abortion. BJC, supra note 5 at 
536. (Not aH the issues 1 here raise were, however, brought forward in petitio-
ners' briefs). Rodríguez Devesa, supra note 93 at 557, 616 points out that civil 
responsibility remains for excused criminal acts. See also Jiménez de Asúa, 
supra note 94 at 201-02. Jonas and Gorby, in their commentary supra note 3 
at 591-92, raise the possibility of civil suits in Germany, and the Dreher and 
Trondle discussion cited supra note 115, makes clear that the legitimacy of 
social insurance payments for unpunished but possibly still unlawful abortions 
is a live issue in Germany. See al so the exceHent survey and argument by W. 
Kluth, who concludes that abortion remains illicit and therefore cannot be a 
duty in civil law. «Zur Rechtsnatur der indizierten Abtreibung», 5 Zeitschrift 
lur das gesamte Familienrecht 440 (1985). 
130. See the Spanish Civil Code art. 1275, which deprives contracts for an 
illicit cause of any effect. An illicit cause is defined to be one opposed to laws 
or morals. Cf. the German Civil Code, article 134. 
131. See e. g. Sigma Reproductive Health Center v. Sta te , 297 Md. 660, 
467 A. 2d 483 (1983); City 01 Sto Louis v. Klocker, 637 S. W. 2d 174 (Mo. 
App. 1982); Cleveland v. Municipality 01 Anchorage 631 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 
1981); People v. Krizka, 92 Ill. App. 3d 288, 48 Ill. Dec. 141, 416 N. E. 2d 
36 (1980); Gaetano v. United States, 406 A. 2d 1291 (D. C. App. 1979). 
These post-Roe lower courts have gene rally refused even to listen to necessity 
arguments concerning the fact and value of prena:tal life. Their opinions are fas-
cinating in the light of the constitutional models developed earlier in this arti-
ele. One might have thought that U. S. courts would construe Roe's 
constitutional right to abortion to be solely a rule against state intervention, 
particularly after the Maher and Harris cases (see supra notes 85 and 88 and 
accompanying text). Private intervention in abortion clinics (to protect what 
proferred evidence supposedly would show to be human life with significant 
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necessity (preservation of the greater legal value) could be 
appealed too Non-violent intervenors could argue «legitimate 
defense» - just as a bank teller can defend himself or an asso-
ciate against a robber acting non-culpably under duress 132. Most 
precisely on point may be that in Spain a person is justified in 
preventing another from destroying something of his or her own 
which has social utility 133. 
ethical, statutory, or common law value) would rema in unaffected by Roe and 
so possibly justified. But in fact virtually all lower court opinions treat Roe as 
imposing a negative value judgement, in regard to the fetus, on the whole legal 
order, quite analogous to the positive value imposed in Spain and Germany. 
The analogy is close: In those European nations the mandated high value of 
fetal life requires the State to punish conduct which destroys the fetus. In the 
U . S. the mandated low value of fetal life requires the State nof fo refrain from 
punishing conduct which prevents fetal destruction. 
It could be argued that some of these lower courts have disallowed the 
necessity defense simply to prevent disorder at abortion clinics, without any 
sense of constitutional mandate. But the bare possibility of acquittal under 
necessity might not significantly increase the number of sitters willing to be 
arrested at abortion clinics. And even if clinic chaos were to result, a quick fix 
might be had in the form of a legislatively imposed abortion exception to the 
necessity defense. Judicial imposition of such an exception would not be 
required . 
132. Both Rodríguez Devesa, supra note 93 at 557, 616 and Jiménez de 
Asúa, supra note 94 at 201-02 make clear that forcible defense is legitimate 
against acts which are merely excused. The former specifically applies this 
principie to the law excusing a parent who harbors a fugitive, at 619. The 
explicit wording of article 8 (4), referring to the defense «of the person or [of) 
rights» might not apply to the defense of the «legal good» of unborn life, but 
article 8 (7) would seem to offer obvious support for abortion clinic interven-
tions. The latter permits actions against personal goods in order to avoid any 
«alien» evil. See the precise wording supra note 94. Of course, there would 
also have to be a weighing of the harm caused by the intervention against the 
value of any fetal life saved. In Spain this calculus is ordinarily based upon a 
comparison of the usual criminal penalties for, say, trespass and abortion. 
Rodríguez Devesa, supra note 93, at 546. The result of the balancing might well 
vary depending upon the means and consequences of the sit-in. 
The wording of the German Penal Code is even more favorable to such 
defenses. In addition to the necessity arguments of articles 34 and 35 of the 
Penal Code, supra note III and infra note 145, articles 32 and 33 would seem 
to provide another justification and excuse argument for nonviolent clinic inter-
ventions . These Notwehr defenses are available to those who act to protect 
«another» against an unlawful attack, and the German court decision seems 
potentially open to an interpretation of the unborn child as «another» . See 
supra notes 40-48 and accompanying texto The Dreher and Trondle commen-
tary, supra note 111 prenote 9g to article 218, at 1002, comments that the 
abortion law should not be interpreted so as to make «necessary help ('Nof-
hilfe') for the unborn» unavailable . There is no evidence, however, that the au-
thor had sit-ins in mind. 
133. Rodríguez Devesa, id. at 554. 
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Nor are these arguments merely technical or sophistic. It is 
clearly one thing to say that someone does not deserve punish-
ment for an act because she could not be expected to behave 
otherwise, and quite another for the State to support or even 
not to prevent that acto Remember that non-demandability is a 
penal law doctrine; there are sorne things which are supposedly 
too much to demand by means of ex post Jacto penalties. The 
Spanish court's own discussion of non-demandability theory (L. 
F. 10) emphasizes that penal punishment for failure to comply 
with a legal norm is sometimes «totalIy unsuitable», which does 
not entail that the norm itself is to be calIed into question. The 
Court also points out that the State's duty to protect the legal 
good of life continues to subsist in other areas. If the State 
aHows civil suits against abortionists, denies insurance coverage, 
does not recognize contracts, and does not punish sit-ins in 
abortion clinics or the equivalent, it is not imposing punish-
ment on women who have had abortions. There is nothing inco-
herent in a legal system which makes aH abortions illegal, but 
excuses sorne women who have them with the thought that 
compliance with the law is too much to demand of persons in 
great distress. To the contrary, a system would be incoherent 
which punished justified acts (e. g. sit-ins) 134 in order to further 
excused ones (i. e. abortions). 
That this is the present state of Spanish law is implied by a 
number of sources. Proponents of abortion depenalization, and 
at least one of the high court dissenters, argued that abortions 
were not being «legalized», as has been pointed out aboye 135. 
Opponents of abortion now read the Court decision to say that 
abortion has not become «licit» 136. If such statements mean 
134. If non-violent clinic intervention were futile (in the sense that women 
wishing abortions will invariably simply postpone them if a particular clinic 
becomes unavailable for a time), the necessity justification for sit-ins would 
lose much of its force. But the mere fact that pregnancy continuation is too 
much to demand by means 01 a posteriori punishment does not, without more, 
prove that prior intervention to close clinics or to dissuade women might not be 
etTective and normatively cal1ed foro Surely a legal system could appropriately 
abolish penalties for some or al1 (attempted) suicides, under nondemandability 
excuse thinking, without entailing the abolition of defenses to battery for those 
who intervene to prevent suicides. 
135. Supra notes 104 and 106. But cf. supra note 108. 
136. So argues Federico Trillo-Figueroa in his early unpublished response 
to the Court entitled «En defensa de la vida» (the same title as that of the pre-
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anything, they indicate a legal situation very elose to that which 
has been described and very far from a legal right to abortion. 
Can a case be mae for a contrary interpretation of the Spa-
nish decision, that it declares non-demandable abortions to be 
not excusable but justifiable and that the statute upheld is in 
fact one of justification? The most obvious argument in favor of 
this interpretation is not a legal but a political one. There might 
be little point in bringing about a legal situation which keeps 
women out of jail but which may well have very little effect on 
the actual availability of abortion. If abortion remains wholly 
illicit, clinics will be under burdens so great that they may find 
it unprofitable to operate. But an attempt at legal argumentation 
can also be made: Excuse reasoning is hard put to explain the 
Court's approval of the non-punishment of the aborting physi-
cian 137. And the analogy of abortion law to fugitive law is not 
perfecto In the latter case, only certain actors (i. e. family 
members) are declared exempt from punishment. In the former, 
the act itself of abortion is deelared non-punishable. From the 
point of view of penal law, what can be made of a norm without 
a penalty? Perhaps the definition (type) of the crime of abortion 
has in effect been cut back after aH, though not by the direct wor-
ding used in the Penal Code 's artiele 489 bis requiring rescue 138. 
decision book referred to supra note 37 and to which he contributed). The anti-
abortion commentary Ley del aborto, supra note 94 at 91ff, 327, also asserts 
and implies the continuing illicitude of almost all abortions. 
137. The Dreher and Trondle commentary, however, has little problem 
treating the physician's exemption as based upon separable public health 
grounds. That is, in order for excused abortions to be performed in safety, phy-
sicians are permitted to perform them, without implying that the law favors or 
is even neutral on the question of whether abortions should occur. Supra note 
111, prenote ge to article 218, at 1001-02. Spanish law has a similar catch-all 
category of excuse, called the «excusa absolutoria», which the law could use 
to understand the status of the aborting physician. See Jiménez de Asúa, supra 
notes 23 and 24. But cf. Bernard Nathanson, Aborting America 193-94 (New 
York: Doubleday, 1979), who argues that the advent of modern antibiotics, of 
the plastic suction curette, and of self-abortive drugs makes illegal abortion no 
longer a major public health problem even if the medical abortionist is held 
penally accountable. (In my own opinion, the total public health effects of the 
non-punishment, or the full legalization, of abortion cannot be known without 
an estimate of the additional number of conceptions · which occur because of the 
availability or legitimacy of abortion as a remedy for pregnancy). 
138. Despite its own conclusion that abortion is only excused, the Dreher-
Trondle commentary, id., makes clear that the dominant legal opinion in Ger-
many Abortion Law: First Experiences» 34 Amer. J. Comp. L 369, 375 n. 40 
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There is an undeniable appeal in the justification interpreta-
tion of non-demandability. Always to value the interests of 
others equally with one's own is a heroic or saintly idea. To 
demand compliance with this ideal would clearly often be too 
much, whence the argument for excuse. But even to ask for 
heroic behavior may seem uncalled foro Don't we have a right 
not to be heroes, without incurring legal disapprobation? Quite 
a few spokespersons for abortion reform made just such an 
appeal, saying that to bear a child after rape or one likely to be 
gravely disabled is to be heroic, not just law-abiding. Analogies 
were made to self-defense law, which gives the victim's interest 
priority over that of the aggressor, and to the legal permission 
not to rescue others where any personal risk is in volved 139. In 
those situations, too, the law recognizes an apparent right not 
to sacrifice one 's own les ser interests for the sake of others' 
greater interests. The communitarian principIes of the necessity 
defense here give way to a deep individualismo 
Such a politico-Iegal theory is quite evidently not in har-
mony with a spirit of dedication to common goals. Instead, it 
would seem to be founded on something like social contract 
reasoning. People with essentially private interests come together 
out of a limited need for mutual defense and cooperation. 
They agree to accept a certain burden, but no more, for the 
sake of their joint enterprise. Once they have made the maxi-
mum expected contribution, they have a right to refuse further 
payments. Where an act or omission is necessary in order to 
and aeeompanying text (Spring 1986) and Gropp gene rally , supra note 97. The 
latter's arguments virtually ignore the need to integrate penal and eonstitutional 
theory, however, while the Dreher-Trondle argument is built upon an attempt at 
sueh integration. 
139. On 25 May 1983, in the Congress of Deputies, the PSOE spokesper-
son Saenz Coseulluela argued that the law values one's own life more than that 
of another, and that the law eannot demand heroism of a pregnant woman. 
Supra note 104 at 1853, 1854. On 7 September 1983, Sotillo Marti argued for 
the abortion depenalization bill by appealing to the faet that the law does not 
always demand that we reseue others, even though it may be our moral duty to 
do so. Again on 5 Oetober 1983, he argued that to require the eontinuation of 
pregnaney in the hardship eonditions eovered by the proposed law would be to 
demand heroism, whieh the Penal Code does not do when it eomes to reseue. 
Supra notes 35 and 33 at 2138, 2946. 
Cf. Sanford Kadish's important attempt to understand the interaetion of the 
values of proportionality and autonomy: «Respeet for Life and Regard for 
Rights in the Criminal Law», 64 Cal. L. Rev. 871 (1976). 
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avoid an excess contribution to public values, that act or omis-
sion is legally justified. 
It is a strange beast, this hybrid of Social State and social 
contract. Prom the point of view of community values, the act 
or omission is wrong. It results in a net value loss. Yet from 
the point of view of the individual, the act is right. The non-
hero reasons that one should not have to give to the community 
anything more than one thinks one is likely to need from the 
community. Since he or she is certainly never going to be a 
fetus in need of maternal support, why should he or she feel 
obligated to give such support? 140. 
The idea of non-demandability can in this way be thought 
to justify abortion (particularly in circumstances of unusual 
hardship) despite the fact that the values of the community, the 
values for the sake of which we have come together, thereby 
suffer. Abortion is somehow justified and not justified at the 
same time. The community permits abortions without saying 
that abortions ought to occur. 
What legal concepts can express the permission to be non-
heroic - in regard to abortiion or to non-rescue or to other 
analogous situations? Surely not «claim» and «duty» . The fact 
that someone violates no legal duty in refusing to maximize the 
common good of life does not mean that others violate a legal 
duty in striving by means other than penal law to further that 
good. In other words, any Spanish (or German) permission to 
abort should be labeled a «liberty» 141 rather than a «right». 
The State does not insist sub poena that a pregnancy continue , 
but neither may a pregnant woman insist upon support or pro-
140. Someone who thinks in this way puzzlingly overlooks the fact that he 
or she has already needed and received aid as a fetus. Yet such an analysis 
appears dominant in the decisions in question. Nowhere is the duty to support 
new life treated in these cases as a matter of simple reciprocity for benefits 
everyone has earlier received. Our friend from Mars, upon reading these consti-
tutional opinions, might well conclude that human adults and fetuses belong to 
entirely . different species , with the former occasionally generously hosting the 
latter as parasite . This point is further developed in Stith, «A Critique of Abor-
tion Rights» supra note 65 . That article also explores more deeply the conflict 
between socialist values and the Roe v. Wade decision. 
141. The reference here is to the concept which Hohfeld calls «privilege». 
See generally, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919). 
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tection for abortion. In this view, abortion would be objectively 
legal, not only excused, but it would be legalized only as a 
liberty and not as a claim upon the community. Such an 
understanding is similar to an old way of looking at the legal 
situation called «necessity» - that it returns all parties in-
volved to a «state of nature», where legal duties and claims in 
the full sense do not yet exist 142. 
But if abortion is only a liberty, involves only the absence 
of penal prohibitions, necessity doctrine might still justify inter-
vention to prevent abortions 143. Necessity always involves indi-
vidual interference with what are otherwise legal rights of 
others. Even where one is not legally required to furnish his 
coat to a freezing child, the child may be excused and even jus-
tified in taking it. Or, better, suppose a nonswimmer bystander 
to be watching helplessly as an unknown child lies drowning at 
the bottom of a pool. A good swimmer walks by but refuses to 
help because he already has a cold and does not wish to risk 
making it worse. The bystander block s the swimmer and grabs 
his hat, telling him he will not get it back unless he rescues the 
child. Would a court convict the nonswimmer of battery or of 
theft? I suspect not. Thus even assuming arguendo that we 
think the swimmer legally justified in refusing to help, we may 
also think the nonswimmer justified in forcing him to help. That 
we do not use the criminal law to coerce people into making 
sacrifices does not mean that we do not wish such sacrifices to 
be made, nor that we are willing to use criminal penalties to 
ensure that no sacrifices are made 144. If pregnancy is only like 
rescuing, and both are just sometimes too much to demand by 
means of criminal penalties, then abortion has not yet won the 
142. See discussion in Rodríguez Devesa, supra note 93 at 555. 
143. And civil damages for abortion might still be recoverable by a father. 
Even an act that is justified under penal law may incur liability for civil da-
mages. See Penal Code article 20, and the commentaries thereon by Jiménez 
de Asúa, e . g. supra note 94 at 198-99. 
144. See also the example mentioned aboye at note 130 concerning the 
Spanish right to prevent someone from destroying his socially useful propertyo 
He would presumably not be punished if he were to destroy his property, but 
neither would someone else be punished who stopped the destructiono 
If American lower courts were to construe Roe Vo Wade only to grant women 
«liberty» to abort (by making them immune to criminal prohibition), then even 
in the U. S. interference in abortion clinics might turn out to be justified. But 
cfo what U . S. courts actually have done, supra note 131. , 
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full support of the law. Particularly under a jurisprudence of 
«effective» community values, it would seem that courts ought 
to ignore rules wherever acts further the greater constitutional 
value. And, at least in the case of abortion to avoid bearing a 
disabled child, it would be very hard for a Spanish tribunal to 
find that prevention of such an abortion, by means of non-
delivery of abortifacients orof a non-violent sit-in, is not in 
accord with the constitutional order of values. On the side of 
the fetus are the values of life and protection for the handicap-
ped, while the Court mentions no constitutional value at all on 
the side of abortion. 
The theoretical and practical disadvantages of the conclu-
sion reached here are obvious. Abortion, even if fully legal in 
the sense that non-rescue in the face of risks is fully legal, may 
still not become easily available - because non-cooperation 
with, and even intervention against, the performance of abortion 
may be justified by the thinking at the base of the necessity 
defense 145. Conceptual and public order may thereby be threa-
tened. These disadvantages do not often arise in the parallel case 
of non-rescue, because not rescuing another does not ordinarily 
require the participation of third parties, nor does the interven-
tion of third parties ordinarily preclude not rescuing. By con-
trast, abortion necessarily implicates third parties and the 
judicial system which judges those parties. 
If the idea of non-demandability were limited to exclusing 
women who undergo abortions, it would lead to no such anoma-
lous results and would probably find near universal support. 
Most states in the U. S., for example, de Jacto and even de 
145. But the German penal article 32 (establishing the defensive force doc-
trine of Notwehr) supra note 132, would not provide a defense for clinic inter-
venors because that doctrine (unlike necessity) presupposes a prior unlawful 
act, which does not exist if an abortion is in any way justified rather than 
merely excused. As to the German Notstand doctrine: the Zwecktheorie incor-
porated into article 34 requires also that an «appropriate means» be used, 
which the courts might use to disallow the necessity defense to sorne or all cli-
nic intervenors. The Dreher-Trondle commentary alludes to the use of this last 
requirement to protect individual rights against more important community 
values, e. g. by preventing someone from being forced to give blood to a stran-
ger who would die without it. Supra note 111, n. 16 following article 34, at 
192. Nevertheless, article 35 might excuse certain interventions . The latter con-
tains no «appropriate means» requirement. Cf. supra notes 111, 118. 
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jure 146, did not punish women for abortion prior to Roe v. 
Wade. But they did prosecute abortionists. The values of life 
and order are compatible with excuses which are truly and 
merely excuses, with the desire not to use penal law against 
women, but not with more. 
Alternatively, we can hold to a justificatory sense of the 
non-demandability of bearing a child, letting it mean community 
support for a right not to make undue sacrifices . But we can do 
so in an orderly fashion only at the cost of devaluing human 
life (or of somehow honestIy separating fetal life from postnatal 
life) 147. If unborn life has little value, abortion does little if any 
damage, and so contracts for it should be enforced and no one 
is justified in preventing it. 
In other words, either abortion must remain a crime (though 
one for which many or even all women need not be punished), 
or it must be se en to promote the common good (because 
unborn human life hardly counts as part of that good). Only 
these two solutions are internally coherent in theory and 
practice. 
Is the doctrine of non-demandability the best place to begin 
to think about which solution to seek? A good argument can be 
made that this doctrine is not a very helpful starting point 
(anywhere in the world) because it is likely one-sidedly to obs-
cure as much as it reveals of the legally significant dimensions 
of pregnancy and of abortion. 
To ask whether a continuation of pregnancy in certain cir-
cumstances is demandable of a woman is to emphasize exclusi-
vely the affirmative and sacrificial character of pregnancy. In 
other words, it makes us think of pregnancy as an act of giving 
and of abortion as an omission or a ceasing so to give. But 
surely in many ways abortion is an act by the mother or by her 
agent, and continued pregnancy is an omission. Somehow this 
makes a difference. It is often worse legally, if not morally, to 
146. See Paul D. Wohlers, «Women and Abortion», published undated by 
the American Center for Bioethics. The author surveys pre-Roe statutory and 
case law and concludes that women were almost always exempted from punish-
ment by one or the other . 
147. But cf. the discussion of the dilemmas associated with su eh a devalua-
tion earlier in this article at pp. 21-22. 
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throw someone who has slipped into one's home out into the 
freezing cold than not to let her in to begin with. Abortion, at 
the least, is like that act of expulsion. And pregnancy, after 
conception, in an important sense requires no further acts. Ges-
tation is automatic, one might say, as long a one omits to ter-
minate it. This fact makes a difference at least psychologically. 
It is harder to pay taxes than to endure government withholding 
of them. To donate blood to a relative every day for nine 
months could easily feel like a much greater sacrifice than to 
have something similar occur by itself in the womb. The power 
of the non-demandability doctrine is precisely that, in all con-
texts (not just abortion), it makes us treat what could be seen 
as acts instead as omissions. We ask not «Should he have robbed 
the bank?» but «Can we demand that he have his legs be bro-
ken by those trying to force him to rob the bank?» I am not 
suggesting that pregnancy is wholly an omission and abortion is 
wholly an act, only that there are important considerations on 
both sides and the question of non-demandability tends to make 
us overlook one side. 
This focus on omission to sacrifice al so takes our eyes off 
immediate intentions and leads us loosely to speculate about 
ultimate motives - something we would be much less likely to 
do with regard to an act. In the abortion context, for example, 
many write as if avoiding the burdens of pregnancy were the 
main purpose of abortions 148, though Roe itself emphasized 
postnatal burdens 149. But the desire to separate oneself from the 
fetus, before or after birth, is not the sole aim of abortions, 
otherwise adoption would have been mentioned by Roe as an 
alternative way to avoid the burdens to which it points. Clearly, 
many people who have abortions aim not just at avoiding the 
burdens of pregnancy or of childcare, but at not being mothers 
at all. A decisive motive may be to avoid the burdensome 
adoption choice. The intent then comes to be to kilI the fetus. 
A lethal act with a lethal intent is much harder to justify or 
excuse than a failure to be a hero. Non-demandability makes us 
148. See e. g. Regan and Thompson, supra note 121 and Calabresi, supra 
note 70 - though the latter at 114 notes that the purpose may also be to kilI 
the fetus. 
149. Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 153 (1973). 
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forget the first way of looking at abortion and think only about 
the second. 
Furthermore, just as non-demandability makes us turn .away 
from the intent of an otherwise illegal act, it tends to make us 
forget the policy promoted by the particular law at issue. If we 
ask only «Can we force people to kill and risk being killed?», 
we may say «no». But if we ask whether national survival justi-
fies the military draft, we may say «yes». If new life is to be 
treated as a fundamental public value, as the Spanish court 
asserts, it cannot be omitted from the question of how much 
can be demanded. Yet this value is wholly left out of that 
court's demandability discussions IS0. 
Non-demandability also, it seems to me, tends to make us 
think in very general terms. Should one have to sacrifice one's 
legs? Should one be expected, under penalty, to put up with a 
handicapped child? The generic answer to these questions may 
be «no». But we should also refer to the various sources of a 
special duty to make sacrifices. Non-demandability does not in 
itself lsl allude to those sources. 
Thus U. S. commentators have sought to show that, even if 
the fetus were a person, the law should not impose the burden 
of supporting him or her on the mother, any more than one 
should have to support a famous violinist who needs transfu-
sions for nine months 152. But if the fetus is a person, it is not 
only a persono It is also one's own child, and that fact may 
make all the difference. 
It is true that the Spanish high court uses the normal bur-
dens of parents as a standard of what can be demanded 153, 
which is no doubt higher than the standard for citizens in gene-
ral. But are parents committed to putting up only with «nor-
mal» burdens? This question is never clearly addressed. Though 
the Spanish court uses article 8 necessity as a prop for its deci-
sion, it never discusses that portion of article 8 which denies 
150. See George Fletcher's argument that even excuse reasoning must 
involve value-balancing. Supra note 100. 
151 . But demandability as found in the German Penal Code article 35 does 
require an inquiry into special legal relationships . 
152. Supra note 121. The violinist is Thompson's creation. 
153. See L. F . 11, Eje, supra note 5 at 535 . 
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the necessity defense to one who has a special obligation to 
sacrifice herself 154. 
Nor are the many possible sources of the duties of parents 
explored. Is there a natural duty resulting from a biological 
relationship? Is there a duty resulting from causation, from the 
sexual creation of a situation in which the fetus is in peril? Or 
does the act of intercourse involve a tacit consent to care for 
life resulting from that act? 155 Does it matter that, if one were 
still a fetus, one would enter into a social contract to give 
birth, even under hardship, to other fetuses in order to be born 
oneself in like circumstances? Rather than careful analysis of 
the strengths of each such factor, non-demandability (at least as 
expounded by the Spanish and German Constitutional Courts) 
encourages a superficial global assessment. 
Yet in the final analysis, despite aH its flaws, the question 
of demandability should not be overlooked. Most of the myriad 
sources of obligaation listed aboye end up with women carrying 
greater burdens than meno That is, the burdens even of ordinary 
pregnancy, not to speak of hardship pregnancy, are greater than 
our law place s on non-pregnant people during most of their 
lives and those burdens faH unequaHy onto one sex 156. Whether 
or not we consciously have recourse to a doctrine of non-
demandability, we are bound to feel uneasy about demanding 
that women alone bear such burdens. 
There are two ways, in my opinion, that this uneasiness can 
be overcome -and both bring us back to the Social State. As 
the Spanish court pointed out (L. F. 11) with regard to the bur-
den of handicapped children, community aid can make the 
sacrifices entailed by pregnancy and parenthood much less- to 
the point where they may be demandable. If the legal commu-
nity highly values unborn life, it ought to share the burden of 
154. The Spanish Penal Code's article S (7) (tercero) states that the neces-
siity defense is available only to one who does not have an obligation to sacri-
fice himself «(... [que 1 no tenga, por su oficio o cargo, obligación de 
sacrificarse» ). . 
155. Spanish law also creates another exception to article S's necessity 
defense for those who intentionally bring about the state of necessity. It would 
~eem arguable that a consciously intended conception would exclude a later 
necessity defense to abortion. And there is discussion in Spain concerning the 
lowering of this intentionality requirement to some degree of risk-taking. 
156. See generally Calabresi, supra note 70 especially at tOlff. 
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bearing that life by rneans not only of social support services 
before and after birth, but even of special benefits and privile-
ges for rnothers 157 - inc1uding rnothers who give up their chil-
dren for adoption. That is what is often done in gratitude to 
young people who have been soldiers. 
Secondly, the cornrnunity rnust not refrain frorn asking for 
signficant sacrifices frorn others besides wornen who have spe-
cial abilities to contribute to what we value in cornrnon. Frorn 
taxation and business regulation to zoning and blood donation, 
a high standard of expectation rnust be set - and backed up by 
sorne sort of penalty for unexcused failure to cornply with that 
standard. Only then will the sacrifices of pregnancy seern 
obviously dernandable. It is on sorne level bizarre, even if logi-
cally consistent, to take a stand both against abortion and for a 
laissez-faire econorny and society. 
157. Mary Ann Gle~don, supra note 54, indicates that almost all Western 
nations provide maternity benefits, child care, paid leaves, paternity support, 
family benefits and .the Iike to a far greater degree than is done in the U . S. 
Perhaps it is partially for this reason that the burdens at least of normal preg-
nancy and parenthood seem not too much to demand in Germany and 
Spain. 
